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ABSTRACT 
 The traditional response to school violence by legislators and school districts has 
been mostly reactive. Scholars and existing research in the field of school safety and 
security recommend a critical safety and security initiative that is proactive and works to 
prevent violence by identifying concerns early on through behavioral threat assessment 
practices. This thesis applied a multi-step qualitative and comparative policy analysis 
framework that evaluated existing opportunities to increase the safety and security 
posture of schools. This study evaluated strengths and weaknesses in school safety and 
security by drawing lessons from past incidents of school violence in the United States, 
assembling contributing factors to inaction, comparing another country’s holistic 
approach to targeted violence, and evaluating gaps in existing school safety legislation. 
This thesis used scholarly research to make school safety and security recommendations 
at the federal, state, and local levels—for legislators, public safety professionals, school 
district leadership, and particularly, school safety and security professionals in Texas. 
This thesis found that for behavioral threat assessment and management to be an effective 
violence prevention strategy, school officials and legislators ought to develop programs 
and implement training and measurement tools that focus on efficacy rather than 
compliance or broad measures that consequentially affect children who do not pose a 
threat. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
School safety and security form a complex issue. Educators, as well as safety and 
security professionals, must balance the implementation of safety and security measures 
without sacrificing privacy rights and what should be welcoming learning environments 
for children. The increased frequency and lethality of violence within the American public 
education system highlights the importance of conducting a closer examination of 
contemporary school safety and security initiatives to identify prevailing opportunities and 
effective practices through research and empirical evidence.1 
The pervasiveness of violence in American schools has been a problem for decades. 
With growing casualty rates and increased media coverage, federal, state, and local 
governments are pressured to enact laws, mandates, and initiatives aimed at preventing 
school violence.2 The Federal Commission on School Safety and multiple state-led 
mandates, which include legislative actions, were either introduced or became law in 
2018—one of the deadliest school years since the 1970s.3 States that bore witness to highly 
publicized 2018 school shootings, such as Florida and Texas, have responded by enacting 
a range of measures, including the use of school-based behavioral threat assessment and 
management as a strategy to counter violence within the public education system.4 
Behavioral threat assessment and management processes help educators, and school safety 
and security professionals understand precipitating behaviors, stressors, and violence 
mitigators that should be regulated or leveraged to promote safety. Having a deeper 
understanding of what causes concerning behaviors helps school administrators formulate 
1 “Shooting Incidents Graphs 2010-Present Archives,” K-12 School Shooting Database, accessed July 
24, 2020, https://www.chds.us/ssdb/category/shooting-incidents-2010-present/. 
2 Michelle Exstrom, “School Safety: Overview and Legislative Tracking,” National Conference of 
State Legislatures, May 8, 2019, http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/school-safety.aspx. 
3 Federal Commission on School Safety, Final Report of the Federal Commission on School Safety 
(Washington, DC: Federal Commission on School Safety, 2018), https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-
safety/school-safety-report.pdf. 
4 “Unprepared and Overwhelmed,” South Florida Sun Sentinel, December 28, 2018, https://projects.
sun-sentinel.com/2018/sfl-parkland-school-shooting-critical-moments; Alex Samuels, “Gov. Greg Abbott 
Signs Several School Safety Bills in Wake of Shooting at Santa Fe High,” Texas Tribune, June 6, 2019, 
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/06/06/texas-santa-fe-mass-shooting-mental-health-school-safety/. 
xvi 
better management strategies, which in turn may keep students from progressing down a 
pathway of violence where retribution becomes the solution to correct a perceived wrong.5 
U.S. government agencies have conducted multiple studies regarding behavioral 
threat assessments. Still, a recent 2019 Secret Service study highlights the importance of 
effective behavioral threat assessment and management processes in school violence 
prevention.6 Before behavioral threat assessment and management, threats and concerning 
behaviors were dealt with by enacting zero-tolerance policies, which often resulted in the 
expulsion of students or criminal prosecution. Behavioral threat assessment does not 
replace disciplinary actions, but if done effectively, the number of conduct violations may 
be significantly reduced by adding a process designed to provide support and risk 
management rather than simply punish.7 
This thesis applied a multi-step qualitative and comparative policy analysis 
framework that outlined the issues by defining the problem, assembling the evidence, 
projecting outcomes, and deciding courses of action.8 This study evaluates strengths and 
weaknesses in school safety and security by drawing lessons from past incidents of school 
violence, assembling contributing factors to inaction, comparing another country’s holistic 
approach to counter incidents of targeted violence, and evaluating gaps in existing school 
safety legislation.  
This thesis found that to be done effectively, behavioral threat assessment and 
management require the implementation of training, information sharing, and 
measurement tools that focus on efficacy instead of compliance or broad measures that 
consequentially affect children who do not pose a threat. This thesis determined that 
5 Melissa A. Louvar Reeves and Stephen E. Brock, “School Behavioral Threat Assessment and 
Management,” Contemporary School Psychology 22, no. 2 (2018): 148–62, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40688-
017-0158-6.
6 Lina Alathari et al., Protecting America’s Schools: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Targeted School
Violence (Washington, DC: National Threat Assessment Center, 2019), https://www.secretservice.gov/data/
protection/ntac/Protecting_Americas_Schools.pdf. 
7 “Zero Tolerance,” University of Virginia, accessed August 15, 2020, https://curry.virginia.edu/
faculty-research/centers-labs-projects/research-labs/youth-violence-project/violence-schools-and-1. 
8 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012). 
xvii 
behavioral threat assessment practices should leverage the collective expertise of multiple 
stakeholders, ensure accurate understanding of existing privacy rights to guide information 
sharing practices, develop proper case management protocols, and implement policies that 
ensure beneficial information is not lost as a child moves from school to school.  
Through a review of Texas and federal legislation, this thesis found both valuable 
elements as well as opportunities to enhance safety and security measures aimed at 
preventing school violence. In 2019, Texas took an essential step in increasing school 
safety and security measures through legislation, but despite making significant strides, to 
date, little guidance has been provided regarding how to assess if proper behavioral threat 
assessment case management and information sharing processes are being conducted.9  
This thesis identifies areas where existing gaps should be addressed sooner rather 
than later, as failure to do so, will likely affect desired outcomes. By identifying existing 
opportunities, offering solutions, and recommending relevant legislation, this thesis helps 
educational institutions and homeland security stakeholders prioritize resources to build 
effective school safety and security programs.  
It may never be possible to prevent violent attacks from happening in schools 
entirely, but schools must mitigate the risk through both proactive and protective means by 
developing processes that are defensible. This research concludes that there is no single 
solution to school safety and security. The focus must be placed on developing a layered 
security protocol that leverages entire communities to make school violence prevention an 
attainable goal.  
The primary audience of this thesis includes legislators, school district leadership, 
mental health professionals, public safety professionals tasked with providing school safety 
and security functions, and fusion centers. While the narrow scope of this thesis was 
intended for Texas, the recommendations outlined in this thesis can be broadly applied at 
a national level. 
9 Texas School Safety Center, “Model Policies and Procedures to Establish and Train on Threat 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Failure to connect dots and poor information sharing were cited as reasons for the 
formation of the Department of Homeland Security following the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, but despite having a clear understanding of impediments and an 
outlined mission, the implementation of solutions continues to pose challenges to 
homeland security professionals.1 The American public-school system is faced with 
similar challenges, which highlights the importance of conducting a closer examination of 
school safety and security initiatives to identify opportunities and practices through 
research and empirical evidence.  
Some may question the classification of schools as a component of the Homeland 
Security enterprise, but the role of American schools has significantly evolved. In addition 
to readying youth for the American workforce, higher education, and military service, 
school districts offer nutritional services, healthcare, social-emotional learning, and mental 
health support to some of the most fragile youth groups.2 The nexus between the public 
education system and national security has been recognized by Retired Admiral William 
McRaven. When asked which national security threat was his greatest concern, his 
response was “K-12 education.”3 It is within this particular context that this thesis is 
extremely relevant. Indeed, it highlights the need to enact proactive school safety measures 
rather than continuing to be reactive to acts of violence. Through research and analysis, 
this thesis provides a roadmap for the implementation of legislation and policies that 
respect all students, cultures, special needs, and privacy by focusing on prevention and 
support rather than punishment. After years of missed opportunities, the time to apply 
lessons that school officials, legislators, and entire communities have failed to learn is now, 
 
1 Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Information Sharing Strategy 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 9. 
2 “Why Education Matters to Health: Exploring the Causes,” Virginia Commonwealth University, 
February 13, 2015, https://societyhealth.vcu.edu/work/the-projects/why-education-matters-to-health-
exploring-the-causes.html. 
3 David Choi, “Navy SEAL Who Oversaw bin Laden Raid Says America’s Biggest National Security 
Issue Is the K-12 Education System,” Business Insider, July 8, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/
navy-seal-william-mcraven-education-biggest-security-issue-2020-7. 
2 
as evident by the increasing level of violence within the American public-school system. 
U.S. diplomat and former Secretary of State John Dulles offered a valuable lesson in 
problem-solving when he stated, “The measure of success is not whether you have a tough 
problem to deal with, but whether it is the same problem you had last year.”4 
A. LEARNING FROM PAST LESSONS
The pervasiveness of violence in American schools has been a problem for decades,
and with growing casualty rates and increased media coverage, federal, state, and local 
governments are pressured to enact laws, mandates, and initiatives aimed at preventing 
school violence.5 The Federal Commission on School Safety and multiple state-led 
mandates, which include legislative actions, were either introduced or became law in 
2018—one of the deadliest school years since the 1970s.6 States that bore witness to highly 
publicized 2018 school shootings, such as Florida and Texas, have responded by enacting 
measures that range from fortifying schools to arming teachers, to creating large databases 
that contain student threat assessments, school discipline records, juvenile crime records, 
and social media posts.7 
The use of behavioral threat assessment and management as a violence prevention 
tool was outlined as an effective strategy in the 2018 report by the Federal Commission on 
School Safety.8 The Secret Service also identified the importance of behavioral threat 
4 Dianne L. Gadow, “It’s Time—Strengthening Partnerships throughout the Juvenile Justice System,” 
Corrections Today 70, no. 1 (February 2008): 6. 
5 Michelle Exstrom, “School Safety: Overview and Legislative Tracking,” National Conference of 
State Legislatures, May 8, 2019, http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/school-safety.aspx. 
6 Federal Commission on School Safety, Final Report of the Federal Commission on School Safety 
(Washington, DC: Federal Commission on School Safety, 2018), https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-
safety/school-safety-report.pdf. 
7 “Unprepared and Overwhelmed,” South Florida Sun Sentinel, December 28, 2018, https://projects.
sun-sentinel.com/2018/sfl-parkland-school-shooting-critical-moments; Alex Samuels, “Gov. Greg Abbott 
Signs Several School Safety Bills in Wake of Shooting at Santa Fe High,” Texas Tribune, June 6, 2019, 
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/06/06/texas-santa-fe-mass-shooting-mental-health-school-safety/. 
8 Federal Commission on School Safety, Final Report of the Federal Commission on School Safety. 
3 
assessment and management in its 2018 report.9 One of the key objectives of behavioral 
threat assessment and management is to identify concerning behaviors from students early 
on so that management strategies can be implemented.10 The objective of a robust 
behavioral threat assessment process is to keep individuals from progressing down a 
pathway of violence where retribution becomes the solution to correct a perceived 
wrong.11 Figure 1 illustrates the steps typically taken by individuals who engage in targeted 
violence. Each marker represents an opportunity to deescalate. 
 
Figure 1. The Pathway to Targeted Violence12 
 
9 National Threat Assessment Center, Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model: An 
Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence (Washington, DC: Secret Service, July 2018), 
https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/USSS_NTAC_Enhancing_School_Safety_Guide_
7.11.18.pdf. 
10 Federal Commission on School Safety, Final Report of the Federal Commission on School Safety. 
11 Melissa A. Louvar Reeves and Stephen E. Brock, “School Behavioral Threat Assessment and 
Management,” Contemporary School Psychology 22, no. 2 (2018): 148–62, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40688-
017-0158-6. 
12 Source: “Pathway to Violence,” WAVR-21, accessed July 13, 2020, https://www.wavr21.com/
pathway-to-violence-2/. 
4 
U.S. government agencies have conducted multiple studies regarding the efficacy 
of behavioral threat assessment and management, but a recent 2019 Secret Service study 
highlights the importance of effective behavioral threat assessment and management 
processes in school violence prevention.13 Prior to behavioral threat assessment and 
management, threats and concerning behaviors were dealt with by enacting zero-tolerance 
policies, which often resulted in the expulsion of students or criminal prosecution. This 
consequential and reactive framework leverages school regulations and law enforcement 
as simple solutions to what often are complex problems. School-based law enforcement 
has multiple roles, including relationship building and mentorship, which are functions that 
become clouded due to the overuse of law enforcement for consequential practices. The 
social discourses of 2020 and recent calls to remove law enforcement from schools 
highlight the challenges faced by law enforcement when they become the panacea for 
resolving complex problems. Behavioral threat assessment does not replace disciplinary 
actions, but if it is done effectively, the number of conduct violations may be significantly 
reduced by adding a process designed to understand what is propelling concerning 
behaviors so that a management strategy—involving counseling, social-emotional 
learning, and other forms of support—can be implemented. Studies have shown that zero-
tolerance policies are highly ineffective, and minority students are disproportionally 
affected by such practices.14  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Despite behavioral threat assessment and management being an important violence 
prevention initiative, recent acts of school violence exemplify the confusion associated 
with how to effectively implement school-based behavioral threat assessment and 
management programs. For example, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public 
Safety Commission identified poor training, poor management, and lack of information 
 
13 Lina Alathari et al., Protecting America’s Schools: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Targeted 
School Violence (Washington, DC: National Threat Assessment Center, 2019), https://www.secretservice.
gov/data/protection/ntac/Protecting_Americas_Schools.pdf. 
14 “Zero Tolerance,” University of Virginia, accessed August 15, 2020, https://curry.virginia.edu/
faculty-research/centers-labs-projects/research-labs/youth-violence-project/violence-schools-and-1.  
5 
sharing regarding the school’s behavioral threat assessment processes as contributing 
factors to the school shooting that resulted in 17 casualties.15 Additionally, the challenge 
of sharing data with law enforcement agencies without compromising existing privacy 
rights highlights the need to develop actionable, reasoned implementation guidelines, and 
corresponding legislation.16 This issue is exemplified in states like Florida and Texas, 
where the implementation of behavioral threat assessment and management teams in all 
public schools is mandatory, and consideration should be given in developing legislation 
that promotes safety without compromising privacy and the trust of all stakeholders.  
Specifically, Texas Senate Bill (S.B.) 11 requires public and charter schools to 
implement and prioritize the formation of school-based threat assessment and management 
teams.17 S.B. 11 allocates funding for training, hiring additional counselors, and providing 
telemedicine for mental health needs.18 However, currently, there are no standardized 
processes for case management, including methods to measure the efficacy of behavioral 
threat assessment and management programs, and there are no processes in place governing 
the dissemination of threat assessment information from school to school or from district 
to district.19 The Texas School Safety Training Center, the research center responsible for 
implementing and overseeing school safety functions in Texas, developed a broad 
framework of model policies and procedures for threat assessment programs. This model 
program was published in 2020 through a tool kit guide; however, the referenced guidelines 
 
15 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission, Final Report of the Marjory 
Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission (Tallahassee: Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement, 2019), http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/MSD-Report-2-Public-Version.pdf. 
16 Santa Cruz County, Assessing the Threat of Violence in Our Public Schools: Is Enough Being 
Done? (Santa Cruz: Santa Cruz County, June 13, 2017), http://www.co.santa-cruz.ca.us/Portals/0/County/
GrandJury/GJ2017_final/SchoolThreatAssessment.pdf. 
17 Greg Abbott, Improving School Safety in Texas (Austin: Office of the Governor, 2019), https://gov.
texas.gov/uploads/files/press/Aug_2019_School_Safety_Update.pdf. 
18 Abbott. 
19 Texas Association of School Boards, “School Safety after Senate Bill 11” (Austin, Texas 
Association of School Boards, 2019), https://www.tasb.org/services/legal-services/tasb-school-law-esource/
business/documents/school-safety-after-senate-bill-11.pdf. 
6 
lack methods for effective implementation of case management, performance measures, 
and data sharing practices—making the guidelines suggestive rather than executable.20  
Like Texas S.B. 11, Florida’s Senate Bill 7030, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas 
High School Public Safety Act, mandates the creation of school-based behavioral threat 
assessment and management teams.21 However, S.B. 7030 specifically describes how 
Florida manages threat assessment data and data sharing through the implementation of a 
central law enforcement records database.22 The bill recommends that all school threat 
assessment records in Florida are forwarded to a state-wide law enforcement database that 
contains school disciplinary, student arrest, and family services records.23 The Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) codify exceptions to privacy-record confidentiality, and 
students who pose a threat should fall under the existing safety exceptions.24 Florida’s S.B. 
7030 is receiving significant push-back by privacy rights groups, and its application could 
compromise public trust.25 Lack of public trust and parental involvement may keep 
students and parents from reporting concerning behaviors, thus compromising an important 
balance between proactive measures and privacy. For example, the Secret Service’s 
National Threat Assessment Center identified effective reporting mechanisms and 
community involvement as significant steps in forming effective threat assessment 
teams.26 Developing policies and programs that clash with laws intended to protect 
students could tarnish the efficacy of threat assessment and management initiatives. 
 
20 Texas School Safety Center, “Model Policies and Procedures to Establish and Train on Threat 
Assessment” (San Marcos: Texas School Safety Center, 2020), https://locker.txssc.txstate.edu/f40474
bcbab5f025bb1570f1bfbf9f06/Model-Policies-and-Procedures-to-Establish-and-Train-on-Threat-
Assessment.pdf. 
21 S.B. 7030, 2019 Leg. (Fla. 2019), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2019/07030. 
22 S.B. 7030, 2019 Leg. (Fla. 2019). 
23 S.B. 7030, 2019 Leg. (Fla. 2019). 
24 Sarah Collins, “Proposed Florida School Safety Policies Undermine Student Privacy,” Student 
Privacy Compass, March 26, 2019, https://studentprivacycompass.org/collins1/. 
25 Katya Schwenk, “Florida ‘Student Safety’ Database Fell Short, Commission Says,” EdScoop, 
August 16, 2019, https://edscoop.com/florida-student-safety-database-public-safety-commission/. 
26 Alathari et al., Protecting America’s Schools. 
7 
Lessons from Florida’s approach to school-based threat assessment and 
information sharing initiatives offer Texas opportunities to enhance proactive measures 
that align with privacy rights, creating an ecosystem where policy, proactive measures, 
privacy, and human conduct work collectively toward the same goal. Texas took a bold 
step in the right direction by mandating the formation of school-based threat assessment 
and management teams along with other school safety measures, but how to effectively 
institute and manage threat assessment programs remains at the discretion of each 
individual school district. Legislative or other legal mandates governing case management 
and information sharing have not been instituted. As opportunities to do better abound, 
schools must create programs and policies that align proactive violence prevention 
programs and protocols without compromising public trust. This thesis ultimately predicts 
that behavioral threat assessment databases that focus too broadly on data collection and 
lack privacy rights considerations will do little to promote school safety but will instead 
corrupt public trust and the inherent side effects that follow. 
Rather than waiting for predictions to morph into reality, this thesis recommends 
legislation to govern threat assessment case management and statewide threat-assessment 
information-sharing in Texas. The Texas recommendation leverages law enforcement 
partnerships when needed without compromising FERPA, HIPPA, or the trust of parents 
and the community. By following the path of proactive violence prevention measures, this 
thesis recommends the adoption of pending federal legislation that should become part of 
the Department of Homeland Security’s national violence prevention strategy by making 
behavioral threat assessment and management functions, a community-based program. The 
often-reactive role of school leadership, law enforcement, and legislators in times of 
increased acts of violence requires a new holistic strategy that leverages all stakeholders to 
prevent violence before it happens. Violence is a multifaceted issue, and there is no 
panacea, but if done correctly, behavioral threat assessment and management may 




This thesis explores current efforts and available opportunities in Texas to
implement effective school safety measures by asking, 
• What is needed for behavioral threat assessment and management
protocols to be effective?
• Is it possible to share behavioral threat assessment information without
compromising existing student privacy rights, and if so, how?
• What local, state, and federal measures should be implemented to promote
school safety and security holistically?
D. RESEARCH DESIGN
This thesis focused on offering recommendations for current legislation in the area
of behavioral threat assessment by demonstrating the existing problems with current school 
behavioral threat assessment and management practices through an examination of 
precipitating events to school violence, related societal challenges, a comparative policy 
analysis with Switzerland, and recent changes in school safety legislation. 
More narrowly, this thesis focused on the following topics: 
• Missed opportunities to learn from past incidents of school violence,
• Understanding what drives targeted violence,
• Impediments to action,
• The gun debate,
• A comparative analysis with Switzerland,
• Existing legislation and information sharing initiatives,
• Privacy rights considerations, and
• Local, state, and federal school safety recommendations and legislation.
1. Limits
This thesis focused on the implementation of proper methods of behavioral threat 
assessment and management in K-12 educational institutions in Texas and concerns 
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associated with sharing federally protected student data with other school districts and law 
enforcement. This thesis was oriented toward the role of school districts and its governing 
body, the Texas Education Agency, and state legislators. This thesis did not focus on law 
enforcement recommendations or information sharing with other organizations or the 
public at large. While the narrow scope of this thesis was intended for Texas, the 
recommendations can be broadly applied nationally.  
2. Data Sources
The data utilized included mandates that were introduced in 2018 or later intended 
to enhance school safety, laws, open-source documents, scholarly articles, and government 
publications. By analyzing the outlined data sources, this thesis drew conclusions regarding 
contributing factors to past acts of school violence, provided context to contemporary 
issues facing school safety, and justified recommendations for school safety measures at 
the local, state, and federal levels. 
3. Type of Analysis
This thesis applied a multi-step qualitative and comparative policy analysis 
framework that outlined the issues by defining the problem, assembling the evidence, 
projecting outcomes, and deciding courses of action.27 By analyzing past incidents of 
school violence, contemporary school-based behavioral threat assessment policies and 
legislation, case management, impediments, data sharing, and publicly available data—or 
lack of publicly available data from Florida and Texas—this thesis evaluated the efficacy, 
pointed out disparities, and offered recommendations that promote symbiosis of school 
safety and security policy and privacy.  
4. Outputs
This thesis leveraged the findings of the research to prescribe legislative action 
aimed at the State of Texas to enhance school-based behavioral threat assessment and 
management practices, including effective threat assessment screening and proper case 
27 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012). 
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management. This thesis also provided a general framework to share protected student 
information without compromising privacy rights. Other states might apply the same 
recommendations, despite their being developed for Texas, either to launch or enhance 
their school-based threat assessment programs. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to explore academic debates on the efficacy 
of school-based behavioral threat assessments as a violence prevention initiative. More 
narrowly, this literature review explores the alignment of recent school-based behavioral 
threat assessment initiatives and data sharing with student privacy rights. The literature 
review outline is based on the following core components: the efficacy of behavioral threat 
assessment, countering school violence through behavioral threat assessment, and 
alignment with existing privacy rights. These three core components provide the 
underpinning for understanding the merits and challenges necessary for deriving effective 
school safety legislation.  
1. Efficacy of Behavioral Threat Assessment 
A corpus of literature discusses the merits of behavioral threat assessments. 
Scholars like Randy Borum et al. suggest that behavioral threat assessments are not a new 
concept and define them as the process of developing a systematic approach to assessing 
whether individuals who make verbal threats pose an actual threat by analyzing behavioral 
indicators.28 The tenure of behavioral threat assessments as a method to prevent violence 
facilitated this review as it offered opportunities to evaluate a wide range of case studies 
and scholarly opinions. For example, federal and local law enforcement agencies, such as 
the United States Capitol Police and the Los Angeles Police Department, have been using 
behavioral threat assessments to protect members of Congress and Hollywood celebrities 
 
28 Randy Borum et al., “Threat Assessment: Defining an Approach to Assessing Risk for Targeted 
Violence,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 17 (1999): 323–37, https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1145&context=mhlp_facpub. 
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since the 1980s and early 1990s.29 When describing the origins of behavioral threat 
assessments and the need for such measures within the Capitol Police, William 
Zimmerman recalls a police mindset that was oriented toward response rather than 
prevention:  
Members of Congress’ staffers were calling up and saying something to the 
effect of “Tom Jones just called and said I am going to do everything in my 
power to make sure that the Congressman is not in office next year.” At that 
time the response would be, “That is not a violation of the law. Call us if 
something happens.”30 
Zimmerman’s statement highlights law enforcement’s reactive and often 
ineffective posture in dealing with threats and concerning behaviors before they escalate 
into violence. The Capitol Police example offers a compelling comparison with how 
schools have historically failed to deal with threats and behavioral issues proactively by 
enacting reactive zero-tolerance policies that, according to research, do little to prevent 
violence.31 A report by the American Psychological Association’s Zero Tolerance Task 
Force argues that a one-size-fits-all policy, such as zero tolerance, is ineffective.32 Instead, 
Mary O’Toole—an expert in the field of behavioral threat assessment and former Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agent—suggests using threat assessment procedures 
to identify the level of risk posed by students.33 O’Toole’s findings and recommendations 
legitimize the importance of properly managing concerning behaviors rather than trying to 
solve the problem through suspension or expulsion. The Marjory Stoneman Douglas 
shooting confirms O’Toole’s conclusion regarding the fallacies of zero-tolerance 
29 Mario J. Scalora and William Zimmerman, “Then and Now: Tracking a Federal Agency’s Threat 
Assessment Activity through Two Decades with an Eye toward the Future,” Journal of Threat Assessment 
and Management 2, no. 3–4 (2015): 268–74, https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000057. 
30 Scalora and Zimmerman. 
31 Farnel Maxime, “Zero-Tolerance Policies and the School to Prison Pipeline,” Shared Justice, 
January 18, 2018, http://www.sharedjustice.org/domestic-justice/2017/12/21/zero-tolerance-policies-and-
the-school-to-prison-pipeline. 
32 American Psychological Association Zero Tolerance Task Force, “Are Zero Tolerance Policies 
Effective in the Schools?: An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations,” American Psychologist 63, no. 
9 (December 2008): 852–62, https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.63.9.852. 
33 Mary O’Toole, The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective (Quantico, VA: Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2000). 
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policies.34 Other scholars, such as Reid Meloy, stress that behavioral threat assessments 
aim to identify, assess, and manage concerning behaviors before they escalate to 
violence.35 Meloy brings credibility to the importance of a structured process by 
highlighting that behavioral threat assessment processes use an evidence-based multi-step 
framework intended to manage a concern before it becomes unmanageable.36  
The literature and research support the applicability of enacting processes to 
analyze and manage concerning behaviors rather than waiting for a criminal violation or 
worse to occur. According to the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit, the most common goal 
for a school shooter is “retribution” due to a “well-developed value system in which 
violence was acceptable.”37 This assertion is valuable because it identifies a common goal 
among school shooters regardless of racial differences, social status, peer pressure, or 
economic boundaries. Furthermore, the Department of Education and Secret Service have 
concluded that 93 percent of “attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that 
caused others to be concerned.”38    
Dewey Cornell uses existing public health initiatives as examples to describe the 
evidence-based nature of behavioral threat assessment: “Just as seatbelts and speed limits 
prevent injuries without predicting who will crash a car and restrictions on cigarette sales 
reduce lung cancer deaths without pinpointing who will get the disease, threat assessments 
aim to prevent violence without profiling potential attackers.”39 
 
34 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission, Final Report. 
35 Anna Miller, “Threat Assessment in Action,” Monitor on Psychology 45, no. 2 (February 2014), 
https://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/02/cover-threat. 
36 Miller. 
37 “The School Shooter: A Quick Reference Guide,” Iowa Department of Homeland Security, 
accessed February 9, 2020, https://www.homelandsecurity.iowa.gov/documents/misc/
FBI_School_Shooter_Guide.pdf. 
38 Bryan Vossekuil et al., The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for 
the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States (Washington, DC: Secret Service and Department of 
Education, 2004), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/preventingattacksreport.pdf. 
39 Miller, “Threat Assessment in Action.” 
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2. Countering School Violence through Behavioral Threat Assessment 
The body of literature for countering school violence through behavioral threat 
assessment is dynamic. For instance, the Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center 
(NTAC) used data based on 41 past incidents of targeted school violence to analyze a variety 
of factors such as “motives, behaviors, and situational factors of the attackers.”40 NTAC’s 
research suggests that the use of behavioral threat assessment and management techniques is 
an effective strategy in “targeted violence” prevention.41 Dewey Cornell et al. conclude that 
structured and well-implemented threat assessment teams have been able to reduce expulsion 
rates through proper threat management protocols, and none of the threats assessed have been 
carried out.42  Cornell’s findings highlight the importance of gaining a better understanding 
of what causes behavior so that a proper management plan can be implemented rather than 
hoping disciplinary or criminal consequences will keep concerning behaviors from re-
occurring or escalating.  
NTAC’s research also highlights the importance of data sharing among schools and 
law enforcement, but little guidance is provided regarding effective ways to avoid operational 
silos or encourage data sharing processes that align with student privacy rights.43 Moreover, 
confusion about sharing information or developing effective behavioral threat assessment 
processes has led to violence. Richard Brusca and Colin Ram suggest that a lack of 
understanding of FERPA and HIPAA kept administrators from sharing concerning 
information about the student who eventually killed 33 people at Virginia Tech.44 FERPA 
and HIPAA laws were created to protect privacy rights, but not at the risk of compromising 
public safety. According to Brusca and Ram, “The privacy laws in place at the time of the 
Virginia Tech shooting provided few legal barriers to the disclosure of key information 
 
40 Alathari et al., Protecting America’s Schools, 3. 
41 Alathari et al., 8. 
42 Dewey G. Cornell et al., “Guidelines for Student Threat Assessment: Field-Test Findings,” School 
Psychology Review 33, no. 4 (2004): 527–46, ProQuest. 
43 Alathari et al., Protecting America’s Schools. 
44 Richard Brusca and Colin Ram, “A Failure to Communicate: Did Privacy Laws Contribute to the 
Virginia Tech Tragedy?,” Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 17, no. 1 (Fall 
2010): 141–68. 
14 
relating to the shooter’s deteriorating mental health condition. Nonetheless, a presumption of 
nondisclosure permeated the campus.”45 Threat managers should have a solid understanding 
of safety exception clauses that regulate the release of federally protected confidential 
information with those who have the need and right to know. 
Similar concerns associated with the poor execution of threat assessment processes 
and a lack of data sharing were identified by the commission tasked with investigating the 
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting.46 The commission warned that Florida 
had no standard threat assessment process and “little to no information sharing.”47 The 
importance of standardized processes governing the training, implementation, and evaluation 
of school-based threat assessment was validated by scholar and threat assessment 
professionals Dave Novotney et al. when they proposed to standardize school-based threat 
assessment initiatives in Oregon’s school system to reduce costs and promote effective 
results.48 Furthermore, the National Association of School Psychologists confirms the need 
for information sharing practices while warning against implementing practices that do not 
align with student privacy rights.49 
3. Alignment with Student Privacy Rights (FERPA and HIPAA) 
Privacy rights representatives and education journalists have voiced concerns over the 
implications of information sharing and the creation of large databases that contain threat 
assessment information. A review of recent threat assessment mandates and proposals in 
Florida highlights concerns over the need to consider privacy rights when implementing 
 
45 Brusca and Ram, 167. 
46 Megan O’Matz, “Teachers Feared Parkland Shooter a Year and a Half before the Massacre,” South 
Florida Sun Sentinel, February 22, 2019, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/parkland/florida-
school-shooting/fl-ne-nikolas-cruz-threat-assessment-20190124-story.html. 
47 O’Matz. 
48 Oregon Task Force on School Safety, A Statewide Threat Assessment System for Oregon Public 
Schools (Salem: Oregon Task Force on School Safety, 2015), https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2017R1/
Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/98554. 
49 Linda M. Kanan, “When Students Make Threats,” Education Digest, November 2010. 
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policies and laws intended to promote school safety.50 In 2018, The Marjory Stoneman 
Douglas High School Public Safety Act set into motion multiple school safety mandates, 
including S.B. 7026, which created a reporting tool called “FortifyFL” to facilitate the 
reporting of concerning behaviors.51 In 2019, S.B. 7030, proposed enhanced information 
sharing practices by creating a central law enforcement database to serve as a repository of 
information with data from multiple sources ranging from police records to school threat 
assessment archives. As a result, representatives of privacy rights organizations, such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, have described Florida’s data-sharing project as a “ ‘mass surveillance’ 
effort with grave implications for student privacy.”52 Indeed, according to the U.S. 
Department of Education’s guidelines on student records privacy, sharing student records 
with law enforcement is limited to qualifying circumstances.53  
Sara Collins further notes that the primary concern revolved around video 
surveillance, law enforcement involvement with threat assessments, processes for 
implementing effective threat assessment practices, and data sharing.54 Collins’ concern with 
the sharing of confidential information with law enforcement is augmented by instances in 
which law enforcement abused their access to sensitive information. A recent audit conducted 
by the Office of California Attorney General Xavier Becerra revealed over 1,000 cases of 
computer database misuse in California by law enforcement officials, highlighting inadequate 
use and poor accountability measures.55 This overreach by law enforcement and government 
 
50 “Safe for Whom? How the MSD Commission Is Putting Florida’s Children in Danger,” Southern 
Poverty Law Center, October 10, 2019, https://www.splcenter.org/20191010/safe-whom-how-msd-
commission-putting-floridas-children-danger. 
51 S.B. 7026, 2019 Leg. (Fla. 2019), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2018/7026. 
52 Katya Schwenk, “Florida’s Statewide Student Data Project Alarms Privacy Groups,” Edscoop, July 
10, 2019, https://edscoop.com/floridas-statewide-student-data-project-alarms-privacy-groups/. 
53 “Does FERPA Distinguish between School Resource Officers (SROs) and Other Local Police 
Officers Who Work in a School?,” Department of Education, accessed January 18, 2020, https://student
privacy.ed.gov/frequently-asked-questions?audience=30&topic=All&page=2. 
54 Collins, “Policies Undermine Student Privacy.” 
55 Sam Stanton, Darrell Smith, and Elliot Wailoo, “California’s AG Investigates Cases of Police 
Database Misuse,” Governing, November 13, 2019, https://www.governing.com/news/headlines/
Californias-AG-Investigates-Cases-of-Police-Database-Misuse.html. 
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agencies brings credibility to concerns voiced by privacy rights scholars. Eli Silverman 
highlights the importance of  police oversight by stating it is “what’s demanded by the public 
or political leaders [but] oversight is generally a stepchild in the tool kit of law 
enforcement.”56 Collins suggests that Florida’s mandate lacks guardrails to protect students 
from government overreach and bias. She states, “When data originally intended to ensure 
that schools serve all children equitably is repurposed in a way that could harm or stigmatize 
them, the state has broken the public’s trust in school and government institutions.”57 
According to Collins, the lack of guidance, record-retention protocols, and a challenge process 
for entering a student into the state-wide database is particularly alarming.58  
This literature review illustrates the strength of behavioral threat assessment and 
management practices in violence prevention but also demonstrates that its weakness lies in 
its application and alignment with existing privacy laws.  
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II explores precipitating events that have led to the enactment of legislative 
actions intended to promote school safety. Chapter III outlines motives by exploring 
grievance-fueled violence—as well as impediments to enacting actionable legislation in the 
United States—and then examines Switzerland’s approach to preventing acts of targeted 
violence. Chapter IV presents existing Texas school safety legislation, current initiatives, and 
privacy considerations. Chapter V concludes with recommended legislation at local, state, and 
federal levels intended to promote synergy among school safety initiatives, data sharing, 
privacy rights, and proactive violence prevention through behavioral threat assessment and 
management.  
 
56 Stanton, Smith, and Wailoo. 
57 Amelia Vance, “School Safety Measures Must Have Evidence, Be Specific, & Have Privacy and 
Equity Guardrails,” Student Privacy Compass, July 24, 2019, 7, http://studentprivacycompass.org/
hsgacletter/. 
58 Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Education, Joint Guidance on the 
Application of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to Student Health Records (Washington, DC: 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2008). 
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II. CATALYST EVENTS TO SCHOOL SAFETY LEGISLATION 
In nearly every instance, students who committed attacks had already come 
to the attention of adults who were concerned about their well-being. 
 —Dewey Cornell and Matthew Mayer59 
This chapter details past incidents of targeted violence at educational institutions to 
outline opportunities to enact preventive school safety and security measures by learning from 
past incidents. With each act of targeted school violence, lessons to learn, adapt and 
implement preventative measures become available. This conclusion is evident in 
commission review reports that typically follow school shootings, such as those by the Federal 
Commission on School Safety, which was created by President Trump after the Marjory 
Stoneman Douglas High School shooting.60 However, in the United States, school districts 
and legislators have been slow to learn from past deadly events, resulting in measures that are 
often reactive.61 School violence is not a novel threat, and America’s 167-year-old history of 
violence within the educational institution dates back to at least 1853—when the first-
documented school shooting committed by a student seeking retribution occurred in 
Louisville, Kentucky.62 On November 2, 1853, Matthew Ward shot and killed his school’s 
principal, William Butler, as retribution for a perceived wrong.63  
The four shootings at educational institutions referenced in this chapter—Columbine 
High School, Virginia Tech, Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, and Santa Fe High 
School—highlight contemporary events of school violence that contain a nexus between 
 
59 Dewey G. Cornell and Matthew J. Mayer, “We Could Prevent School Shootings If We Really 
Wanted To,” NBC News, December 8, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/school-shootings-
could-be-prevented-if-we-intervened-cases-troubled-ncna1097376. 
60 Federal Commission on School Safety, Final Report of the Federal Commission on School Safety. 
61 Donald Gilliland, “How a Proactive, Preventive Approach Can Stem the Tide of School Shootings,” 
The Hill, July 28, 2018, https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/399260-how-a-proactive-preventive-
approach-can-stem-the-tide-of-school. 
62 “History of School Shootings in the United States,” K12 Academics, July 26, 2018, https://www.
k12academics.com/school-shootings/history-school-shootings-united-states. 
63 Robert M. Ireland, “Acquitted Yet Scorned: The Ward Trial and the Traditions of Antebellum 
Kentucky Criminal Justice,” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 84, no. 2 (1986), https://www.
jstor.org/stable/23380287.  
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behavioral threat assessment and information sharing as preventive violence measures. 
Furthermore, the outlined cases and the corresponding reactive legislation and mandates that 
followed provide context to the argument that many school administrators and state legislators 
have not been proactive about enacting processes or laws that can aid in violence prevention. 
A. COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL SHOOTING 
On April 20, 1999, two Columbine High School seniors, Eric Harris and Dylan 
Klebold killed over a dozen people and injured dozens more.64 
1. Precipitating Factors 
Harris and Klebold displayed suicidal and homicidal indicators before the shooting, 
yet those around them failed to connect the dots before warning signs morphed into 
violence.65 The list of concerning risk behaviors included writing entries in journals 
describing violent acts, making threatening posts online, producing alarming video-
recordings, submitting disturbing essays to school staff, downloading explosive-making 
materials, acquiring weapons and explosives, soliciting help from others to acquire additional 
weapons, and engaging in criminal activity.66 Unfortunately, the failure to identity Harris’s 
and Klebold’s journey toward the pathway to violence was not isolated to school officials or 
their parents. Law enforcement officials also failed to take a proactive approach. This gap is 
evident in a review of law enforcement interactions with Harris and Klebold before the 
shooting: “While they were being dealt with by Jefferson County authorities, the two gave 
overt indicators that they were dangerous.”67 Law enforcement authorities, however, failed 
to communicate their findings with school officials and other stakeholders.68  
 
64 Columbine Review Commission, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine Review 
Commission (Denver: Columbine Review Commission, 2001), https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/
files/Columbine%20-%20Governor’s%20Commission%20Report.pdf. 
65 Columbine Review Commission. 
66 Columbine Review Commission. 
67 Columbine Review Commission. 
68 Columbine Review Commission. 
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2. Lessons Drawn from Tragedy 
In addition to the behavioral threat assessment and information sharing components 
that could have been leveraged to prevent tragedy, the shooting at Columbine High School 
highlights a pivotal change in how the American media cover acts of school violence. As the 
Columbine shooting unfolded, the world at large watched from the convenience of their living 
rooms; meanwhile, two teenagers inflicted destruction and mayhem on live television in vivid 
detail.69 Unlike previous incidents of school violence that had gained local, regional, or 
national news coverage temporarily, the Columbine High School shooting dominated national 
news for days.70 This level of publicity gave inspiration to future school shooters and 
subsequent school shootings, thus demonstrating the need for all states to implement proactive 
measures ahead of tragedy.71 Journalist Dave Cullen, who covered the tragedy at Columbine 
High School, weighed the concerns associated with the coverage of school violence events by 
the media: “I have taken to calling them spectacle murders because they are essentially 
performances—and without the media, they have no stage.”72 
In May 2001, the Columbine Review Commission’s report was released by the 
governor of Colorado.73 The report outlined several components, ranging from missed 
opportunities to recommendations to prevent future acts of violence.74 Some of the 
recommendations included the formation of threat assessment teams at every secondary 
school in Colorado, threat assessment training, and the implementation of best practices in 
threat assessment to help recognize concerning behaviors and develop mitigating strategies 
ahead of violence.75 The post-tragedy outcry—which typically follows a school shooting—
 
69 Alicia C. Shepard, “The Columbine Shooting: Live Television Coverage,” Columbia University, 
accessed April 2, 2020, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/j6075/edit/readings/columbine.html. 
70 Benjamin Frymer, “The Media Spectacle of Columbine: Alienated Youth as an Object of Fear,” 
American Behavioral Scientist 52, no. 10 (2009): 1387–1404, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764209332554. 
71 Columbine Review Commission, Report. 
72 Dave Cullen, “From Columbine to Parkland: How We Got the Story Wrong on Mass Shootings,” 
The Guardian, February 9, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/feb/10/columbine-parkland-
gun-crime-dave-cullen. 
73 Columbine Review Commission, Report. 
74 Columbine Review Commission. 
75 Columbine Review Commission. 
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fueled significant changes, ranging from law enforcement’s response to active shooter 
incidents to school safety legislative action.76  
Specifically related to behavioral threat assessments, in the aftermath of this tragedy 
through April 2020, no mandates or legislative action has been enacted in Colorado to form 
threat assessment teams. While training, process, and best-practice recommendations have 
been developed, threat assessment implementation remains optional.77 In relation to 
information sharing, Colorado authorities have passed several legislative acts since the 
tragedy. The various legislation, which sets forth the protocols governing the sharing and 
release of information in compliance with state and federal law, “Allows for information 
sharing between state agencies and schools when there is a need to know to better serve 
children or to protect school safety.”78 The Office of the Colorado Attorney General promotes 
the importance of information sharing by providing a tool that functions as an “information 
conduit” from various sources, including anonymous reports, regarding school safety 
concerns.79  
Despite making progress in prioritizing school safety and security initiatives, 
Colorado offers another important lesson regarding the implementation of threat assessment 
processes: having a process that is not effectively executed will do little to prevent violence. 
In December 2013, Karl Pierson, a student at Arapahoe High School, a school located 
approximately eight miles from Columbine, brought a shotgun and explosives to school. 
Pierson killed another student, Claire Davis, before committing suicide.80 A report 
commissioned after the shooting cited—not surprisingly—inadequate information sharing, 
confusion about student privacy rights, and poor threat assessment practices as contributing 
 
76 Columbine Review Commission. 
77 Colorado School Safety Resource Center, 10 Years after Columbine: Highlights of School Safety 
Efforts in Colorado (Lakewood: Colorado Department of Public Safety, 2009). 
78 Colorado School Safety Resource Center. 
79 “Safe2Tell Colorado: How It Works,” Colorado Office of the Attorney General, accessed July 18, 
2020, https://safe2tell.org/how-it-works. 
80 William Woodward and Sarah Goodrum, Report on the Arapahoe High School Shooting: Lessons 
Learned on Information Sharing, Threat Assessment, and Systems Integrity (Denver: Denver Foundation, 
2016), 141. 
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factors to the incident.81 In response, Colorado legislators passed the Claire Davis School 
Safety Act, which imposes a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for schools that fail to 
protect students from certain acts of violence.82  
B. VIRGINIA TECH SHOOTING 
On April 16, 2007, Seung Cho, a senior at Virginia Tech, killed over 30 people and 
injured over a dozen more.83 
1. Precipitating Factors 
Approximately eight years after Columbine, the Virginia Tech shooting demonstrated 
a similar pattern of missed opportunities, which, like Columbine, included failures to identify 
behavioral warning signs, confusion about student privacy rights, and a lack of information 
sharing.84 This shooting also demonstrated the broader impact Columbine has had in 
inspiring future school shooters.85  
Before the shooting, Cho had displayed a long history of warning behaviors that dated 
back to his middle and high school years, yet it was not until the Columbine shooting that a 
management strategy was implemented to address Cho’s concerning behaviors.86 After the 
Columbine shooting, the staff at Cho’s middle school noticed his concerning behaviors, 
ideations of homicidal violence, which led them to recommend intervention strategies, 
including mental health support.87 Cho’s concerning behaviors were managed throughout his 
secondary school years, but the concerning behaviors returned during his years at Virginia 
 
81 Woodward and Goodrum. 
82 “Claire Davis School Safety Act,” Colorado School Safety Resource Center, July 27, 2017, 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cssrc/claire-davis-school-safety-act. 
83 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech. 
84 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech: Report of the Review Panel 
(Richmond: Commonwealth of Virginia, 2007). 
85 Peter Langman, “Role Models, Contagions, and Copycats: An Exploration of the Influence of Prior 
Killers on Subsequent Attacks,” Langman Psychological Associates, June 22, 2017, 18. 
86 Virginia Tech Review Panel. 
87 Virginia Tech Review Panel. 
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Tech.88 Cho’s increasingly menacing behaviors at Virginia Tech were not effectively 
managed by campus administrators, mental health professionals, and law enforcement in part 
due to incorrect interpretations of health and student privacy laws, which resulted in 
significant communication gaps among key stakeholders, further disrupting opportunities for 
staff to effectively intervene.89 
In June 2007, the Departments of Health and Human Services, Education, and Justice 
issued a report to President George W. Bush about the tragedy at Virginia Tech.90 The report 
made several key findings, including information gaps among education officials, healthcare 
providers, law enforcement, and other stakeholders, the importance of recognizing warning 
signs and aligning mental health with safety and privacy, and challenges facing the 
implementation of violence prevention strategies.91 The title of one of the key findings—
“Where We Know What to Do, We Have to be Better at Doing It”—supports this chapter’s 
assertion that the failure to apply and effectively execute lessons from past acts of school 
violence is a widespread problem.92  
2. Lessons Drawn from Tragedy 
The Virginia Tech tragedy embodies several important components of behavioral 
threat assessment, particularly as it relates to risk behavior and threat management. Cho 
received support throughout his middle and high school years, but once the support structure 
was removed, a dangerous imbalance occurred, the risks increased, and the level of support 
and supervision he received decreased. The university’s communication silos compounded 
this issue even further as outlined by the Virginia Tech Review Panel: “Numerous incidents 
occurred that were clear warnings of mental instability. Although various individuals and 
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departments within the university knew about each of these incidents, the university did not 
intervene effectively. No one knew all the information, and no one connected all the dots.”93 
This finding by the panel highlights an important behavioral threat assessment 
component as it relates to assessing risk behaviors. A deeper look into Cho’s extensive list of 
concerning behaviors and lack of effective management strategies would have helped 
university officials, mental health professionals, and law enforcement gain a better 
understanding of the level of risk posed by Cho. A wide range of safety and security functions 
could have been implemented to disrupt Cho’s journey further on the pathway to violence; 
however, inaction by those around him facilitated his menacing conduct. It is also important 
to note that as with the Columbine shooting, other valuable lessons regarding reactive 
functions, including police response and emergency management roles, were outlined by the 
Virginia Tech Review Panel. 
In the aftermath of the Virginia Tech tragedy, multiple mandates were enacted, 
including the use of threat assessment as a violence prevention tool at public institutions of 
higher education as well as the use of threat assessment teams as a violence prevention tool at 
all K-12 public schools.94 In addition to recommending threat assessment teams, the State of 
Virginia’s enacted policy that outlined information sharing practices among threat assessment 
teams, mental health professionals, and law enforcement in both higher education and K-12 
schools.95 The State of Virginia mandated threat assessment practices at institutions of higher 
education in 2008, but the mandate for K-12 behavioral threat assessment processes was not 
enacted until 2012—after the Sandy Hook Elementary School tragedy. The State of Virginia 
corrected a gap in its school safety framework by deriving lessons from a distant incident 
(Sandy Hook Elementary), which promotes the efficacy of learning from past incidents, as 
employed in this chapter. This begs the question of why other states and educational 
institutions failed to apply lessons from past tragedies, as did Virginia. 
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The State of Virginia also conducted research to assess the efficacy of behavioral 
threat assessment as a violence prevention measure. The results of its study confirm that when 
done correctly, behavioral threat assessment does, in fact, prevent violence.96 
C. MARJORY STONEMAN DOUGLAS HIGH SCHOOL SHOOTING 
On February 14, 2018, Nikolas Cruz, a former Marjory Stoneman Douglas student, 
killed over a dozen people and injured over a dozen others.97 
1. Precipitating Factors 
Approximately 19 years after Columbine and 11 years after Virginia Tech, poor 
behavioral threat assessment processes and significant gaps in communication between school 
officials and law enforcement manifested as contributing factors to school violence.98  
As with the perpetrators of the other two school shootings, before the Marjory 
Stoneman Douglas shooting, Cruz exhibited a long history of concerning behaviors, including 
homicidal and suicidal ideations, which remained poorly appraised and managed despite law 
enforcement’s prior awareness.99 The list of concerning behaviors included a history of 
hurting animals, aggression toward others, an extensive list of disciplinary issues at schools, 
multiple reports of menacing conduct, and online posts of firearms and homicidal threats.100 
School officials, local law enforcement, and the FBI were all aware of concerning behaviors 
associated with Cruz, but they did little to prevent the tragedy.101 The post-tragedy police 
investigation revealed that Cruz had researched other school shootings, including 
Columbine.102 Evidently, according to the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Final Commission 
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Report, the significant “misunderstanding and overapplication of several privacy laws, 
including FERPA and HIPAA,” were yet again impediments to information sharing between 
stakeholders.103    
2. Lessons Drawn from Tragedy 
In January 2019, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety 
Commission’s final report was released. It provided a list of systemic issues, including poor 
security, emergency management training, law enforcement response, and adherence to 
proper threat assessment practices. The report outlined significant missed opportunities to 
identify warning signs, not only by school officials but also by local and federal law 
enforcement. One of the identified gaps brings to question the efficacy of large databases 
intended to serve as repositories of information. A source of information close to Cruz 
contacted the FBI’s National Call Center and provided details that referenced concerns with 
the state of Cruz’s mental health, his menacing behaviors, and the fact he had the means to 
carry out a school shooting.104 Despite the details provided by the caller, the information did 
not lead to an investigation.105 FBI Director Christopher Wray admitted the tip should have 
been investigated.106  
In the aftermath of this tragedy through April 2020, Florida authorities have enacted 
Senate bills that specifically address behavioral threat assessment and information sharing. In 
order to address gaps in behavioral threat assessment, legislative actions have included the 
implementation of threat assessment teams and collection of relevant quantitative data, the 
requirement of mental health services for students who are expelled for firearms or certain 
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threats, and the development of a standardized behavioral threat assessment tool.107 Gaps in 
information sharing were also addressed through legislative action. An Office of Safe Schools 
was created and tasked with coordinating with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
to provide a centralized data analytics center. The proposed central hub of information will 
integrate data from social media, the Department of Children and Family Services, the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement, local law enforcement, and the Florida Department of 
Juvenile Justice.108 Additionally, a reporting mechanism that allows users to submit tips via 
computer or mobile devices is funneled through the same office.109 
In addition to proposing the creation of a central database, amendments to existing 
legislation allow threat assessment teams to have access to confidential information from law 
enforcement, schools, and other government agencies. These legislative changes also 
mandate threat assessment teams to consult with law enforcement once a threat is made or if 
a student commits multiple misdemeanor offenses.110 Florida’s approach to creating a large 
central repository of information has created significant concerns among privacy rights 
groups. Balancing new school safety and security initiatives with existing privacy rights laws 
is an essential component in developing effective processes that foster public trust and 
involvement. Chapter IV of this thesis outlines privacy rights concerns with Florida’s student 
threat assessment database and information sharing practices in greater detail. 
D. SANTA FE HIGH SCHOOL SHOOTING
On May 17, 2018, Dimitrios Pagourtzis, a junior at Santa Fe High School, killed 10
people and injured 13 others.111 
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1. Precipitating Factors 
Approximately three months after the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School 
shooting, another incident of school violence that shares common characteristics with the 
aforementioned cases occurred—this time in Texas. Before the shooting, Pagourtzis displayed 
concerning behaviors at school that were apparent to those around him. A behavioral threat 
assessment had been ordered but not completed before the shooting. He became isolated, he 
posted concerning information and images online, and weeks before the shooting, he wore a 
trench coat with a Nazi iron cross and a hammer and sickle, which is symbology associated 
with the Columbine shooters.112 The Santa Fe School shooting incident highlights the 
importance of gathering as much information as possible during an assessment phase, so that 
threat managers are able to assess risk by weighing the totality of behaviors rather than single 
behaviors.  
2. Lessons Drawn from Tragedy 
Unlike the commissions formed in the wake of Columbine, Virginia Tech, and 
Parkland, it is publicly unknown if the Texas governor ordered a commission report or 
shooting review of the incident, which made researching contributing factors and system gaps 
challenging for this research. Despite the absence of an official report, conclusions can be 
drawn from this tragedy by analyzing its impact on Texas legislation regarding school safety 
and security initiatives. In the aftermath of this tragedy, Texas legislative authorities have 
enacted S.B. 11, school safety legislation that specifically addresses the formation of 
behavioral threat assessment teams; information sharing processes in Texas schools; law 
enforcement information sharing of student arrests; and the formation of school safety 
committees composed of parents, teachers, board members, emergency management, law 
enforcement, and school leadership.113 In addition to threat assessment and information 
sharing initiatives, emphasis has also been placed on physical security enhancements, stronger 
emergency management practices, and arming school employees. The state’s bold step toward 
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enacting strong school safety measures is not without gaps, particularly relating to the 
implementation of behavioral threat assessment and information sharing practices. Chapter 
IV of this thesis outlines issues and considerations with school safety measures in Texas, and 
Chapter V outlines recommendations by exploring strengths and existing opportunities in the 
state’s school safety plan. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The aforementioned cases highlight that despite fatal and highly publicized school 
shooting events, such as the Columbine High School shooting, school safety measures and 
corresponding school safety legislation remain mostly reactive in the United States. Instead 
of focusing on preventive factors, such as information sharing, warning signs identification, 
and behavioral threat assessment and management, opportunities to act are often lost in 
political policy division. The existing gap in developing tangible solutions is evident in the 
gun debate, whose rhetorical talking points discourage consensus and, therefore, 
implementation of meaningful solutions.114 
The reactive nature of school violence prevention is also fueled by the low probability 
of school shootings, promoting a false sense of immunity from violence.115 Shortly after the 
shooting at his school, Columbine High School Principal Frank DeAngelis spoke about his 
initial disbelief of the tragedy occurring there. Only after the shooting did he caution other 
school districts that a school shooting could happen anywhere: “No one ever believed it would 
happen at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. But hopefully, people across the 
nation, across the state, will realize that it can happen in their school.”116 
This false sense of immunity still exists despite multiple recommendations and 
strategies to prevent school violence that pre-date the Columbine tragedy. Indeed, after the 
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Kentucky Heath High School shooting incident in December 1997, President Bill Clinton 
solicited action, and a presidential report on school safety was authored.117 The 1998 report 
outlined several proactive measures to enhance school safety, including promoting mental 
health, being observant to risk behaviors, encouraging partnerships with law enforcement, and 
sharing information.118 Nevertheless, despite having a foundation for such practices since the 
late 1990s, many school districts have not emphasized proactive mental health support, 
building positive school climates, and information sharing initiatives, as evident in the 
aforementioned case studies. This false sense of immunity brought by low likelihood statistics 
is not a defensible approach to school safety and security.  
School leaders may be effective educators, but they should also be open to learning. 
Even when acts of violence occur, history is quickly forgotten, causing decision-makers to 
miss opportunities to enact proactive measures. For example, following the Marshall High 
School shooting, Marshall County School Superintendent Trent Lovett told a local news 
station, “We felt like the safest school district around and then for something like this to 
happen, if it can happen here, I can promise you it can happen anywhere.”119 Lovett’s 
statement to the media exemplifies missed opportunities to learn from past events. The 2018 
Marshall High School shooting was located approximately 30 miles from the scene of the 
1997 Heath High School shooting—the incident that spurred President Clinton’s 1998 school 
safety report.120  
The shortcomings associated with a preventive approach to school violence and the 
ensuing reactive approach have brought about post-tragedy legislative action intended to 
prevent future acts of violence. As shown in Figure 2, as violent events occur, legislative 
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action follows, which supports the conclusion that school violence preventative measures 
have been mostly reactive. The 2018 school year—one of the most violent on record—saw a 
significant number of legislative measures enacted.121 
 
Figure 2. Adoption of State School Safety Laws, 1999–2020122 
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To be effective in preventing school violence, school administrators and legislators 
should not rely on the improbability of a school shooting as part of their safety and security 
posture. Instead, learning from past incidents is crucial so that evidence-based, proactive 
policies can be instituted ahead of tragedy. In order to promote effective implementation, 
school administrators and legislators need a better understanding of what drives a person 
to commit acts of targeted violence.  
However, the gun debate often gets in the way of implementing proactive measures. 
The next chapter analyzes the threat posed by acts of grievance-fueled violence, assesses 
how the gun debate leads to inaction and concludes with a comparative analysis of 
Switzerland’s approach to preventing incidents of targeted violence. In his book 
Comparative Homeland Security, Nadav Morag details the importance of considering 
available opportunities to enact domestic policy by looking abroad to assess how other 
nations tackle problems: 
Looking at the approaches, policies, and experiences of other countries with 
respect to homeland security policy (whether or not they view it as that) 
makes it possible to gain a greater understanding of the options available to 
U.S. policymakers, a sense of how policies should be selected and 
evaluated, and an understanding of the options available to overseas 
partners as well as how they operate and cope with their own threats—many 
of which are, as noted earlier, “transferrable” to the United States.123 
With the gun debate being such a polarized issue, a comparative government analysis 
method was selected to highlight the importance of implementing common-sense, 
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III. COUNTERING “SENSELESS” ACTIONS THROUGH 
SENSIBLE MEASURES 
Perpetrators see their violent acts as a logical and inevitable outcome of a 
situation, a sensible course of action, and they tend to minimize the 
suffering they caused. Victims, for their part, tend to emphasize their 
innocence, the pain they have suffered, or the permanent scars left by the 
trauma. 
  —Maarten Boudry124 
Understanding what drives violence in school environments is an area that requires 
consideration. Research has shown that acts of targeted violence are often fueled by 
grievances that can be real or perceived.125 The desire to mend grievances through 
retribution is often viewed as senseless acts to society, but to the assailant, violence makes 
perfect sense and is part of a well thought out justification process.126 Instead of 
simplifying what has driven someone to commit violence, communities could play a more 
significant role by understanding concerning and identifiable behaviors that have led 
individuals toward a pathway to violence.127 However, instead of focusing on attainable 
evidence-based measures, incidents of targeted violence are met by cries that focus on the 
instrumentality of the crime, which often fuels the gun debate. Firearm legislation is a 
highly polarized issue, and the lack of accord leads to inaction, creating a perpetual cycle 
of violence, gun debate, and inertia.128 This chapter sheds light on motives and objectives 
associated with grievance-fueled violence and highlights opportunities to enact data-driven 
policies to counter acts of grievance-fueled violence. This is done by conducting a 
 
124 Maarten Boudry, “The Myth of Senseless Violence and the Problem of Terrorism,” in The 
Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy, ed. David Boonin, (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 
2018), 149, https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8620706. 
125 Critical Incident Analysis Group, “A Radical New Look at Mass Shooters. Why They Do It and 
How to Stop Them,” University of Virginia School of Medicine, accessed June 26, 2020, https://med.
virginia.edu/ciag/a-radical-new-look-at-mass-shooters-why-they-do-it-and-how-to-stop-them/. 
126 Gordon A. Crews, ed., Handbook of Research on Mass Shootings and Multiple Victim Violence 
(Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2020), https://www-igi-global-com.libproxy.nps.edu/gateway/book/226279. 
127 Alathari et al., Protecting America’s Schools. 
128 Alex Rogers, “Congress Rarely Acts on Gun Control Despite Mass Shootings,” CNN, August 5, 
2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/04/politics/congress-reaction-mass-shootings/index.html. 
34 
comparative government analysis of Switzerland’s approach to counter incidents of 
targeted violence.  
By understanding cause, identifying ineffective policies, and analyzing how 
Switzerland has responded to tragedy, this chapter highlights attainable strategies to 
counter acts of targeted violence. 
A. GRIEVANCE-FUELED VIOLENCE 
The U.S. counterterrorism enterprise has arguably been successful in preventing 
acts of ideology-based terrorism, but the homeland threat landscape has endured several 
smaller-scale attacks from individuals who viewed violence and retribution as an 
instrument to correct personal feelings of being wronged.129 Acts of grievance-fueled 
violence have become a prevalent issue in the United States, impacting multiple segments 
of American life, including concert venues, restaurants, places of worship, the workplace, 
and learning institutions.130 Research suggests that acts of mass violence have continued 
to occur at increasing rates since 1966.131  
The increased frequency of acts of targeted violence can often be attributed to 
grievances or perceived grievances held by the perpetrator.132 A 2017 NTAC report 
produced by the Secret Service highlights the impact of grievance-fueled violence as 
outlined in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Mass Attacks in Public Spaces: Motives and Targeting, 2017133 
 
 
Inadequate coping mechanisms, unmanaged mental health issues, and a lack of 
support or mitigating strategies can cause grievances to escalate to the point that violence 
becomes the solution to mend wrongs through retribution.134 The FBI’s Behavioral 
Analysis Unit has identified “retribution” as “the most common goal” for a school 
shooter.135 Leading experts in the field of behavioral threat assessment and the Department 
of Homeland Security have identified this type of grievance-driven violence, as outlined in 
the Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence: “Many 
perpetrators of mass attacks do not appear to fit the definition of terrorists because they 
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lack a clear ideological motive. They may often be responding to a perceived grievance, 
whether domestic, workplace or of some other nature.”136 
In the days and weeks following the latest targeted violence incident, investigations 
often uncover a pattern of concerning conduct and detectable behavioral clues (pre-event 
indicators) left by the perpetrator before the incident.137 O’Toole details the importance of 
recognizing warning signs: 
Violence—whether in a school, home, workplace, or on the street—is a 
complex issue with complex causes and consequences. Imagining that there 
are easy answers and instant solutions is counterproductive: there is no easy 
way to attack the causes and no simple formula that can predict who will 
commit a violent act. It is also true, however, that violent behavior develops 
progressively, that making a threat represents a stage in an evolutionary 
process, and that there are observable signs along the way that most of us 
can see if we know what to look for.138 
However, law enforcement, government officials, and the public often fail to recognize or 
report concerning behaviors before a tragedy.139 In some cases, even when the public 
contacts local and federal law enforcement authorities, preventive measures are met with 
inaction, further facilitating and propelling the perpetrator toward a pathway that, in many 
cases, results in violence.140  
One FBI study found that “on average, each active shooter displayed 4 to 5 
concerning behaviors over time that were observable to others around the shooter. . . . 
[Commonly,] concerning behaviors were related to the shooter’s mental health, 
problematic interpersonal interactions, and leakage of violent intent.”141 The same study 
found that in 41 percent of the cases, someone reported the concerning behaviors to law 
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enforcement, but in 54 percent, those who witnessed these behaviors did nothing.142 Threat 
assessment practices have been adopted by many federal law enforcement agencies, 
including the FBI, Capitol Police, and the Secret Service. Threat assessment is used to 
protect dignitaries, celebrities, and politicians because it offers a process to capture 
concerning information and assess risk proactively.143  
Rather than introducing and developing threat assessment–type legislation as a 
measure to counter violence holistically, proposed solutions following incidents of targeted 
violence often lead to the very polarized gun debate. It is necessary to understand the 
futility of the gun debate in the state of Texas when considering the introduction or 
imposition of effective legislation. 
B. THE GUN DEBATE 
Unlike many other states, the culture and history of guns in Texas run deep. As 
Jerry Patterson, former Texas state senator and land commissioner, explains it, “Firearms 
have always been part of Texas history, we have people who are very independent-minded, 
people who are self-sufficient and people who needed arms in their daily lives.” 144 The 
connection between firearm ownership and the Texas way of life has ultimately morphed 
into policies that make gun control laws a cultural opponent to the Texan identity. Not 
surprisingly, the cultural and identity nexus of firearm ownership in Texas has resulted in 
measures that strongly promote the right to bear arms. In fact, “Texas gun control laws are 
among the least-restrictive in the U.S.”145 While there are various types of weapons that 
are prohibited under Texas law, restrictions on who can own a firearm, and limitations on 
where firearms may be carried, there is no waiting period, and qualified individuals who 
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have obtained a permit can carry a concealed firearm.146 The culture of people who feel 
the need to protect themselves is evident in the differing reactions to tragic shooting events 
in Texas. Since the 1966 University of Texas tower shooting, Texas has shown a consistent 
reduction in regulations.147 The notion of solving acts of gun violence by arming good 
citizens was further reinforced after the 1995 Luby’s Cafeteria massacre.148 Rather than 
place the blame on the shooter’s access to a weapon, gun advocates like Patterson pushed 
back on the existing regulations that prevented the victims from being able to defend 
themselves.149 The results were victories for gun advocates in Texas: 
1. The state’s Castle Doctrine was extended in 2007 beyond the curtilage 
(the area of land occupied by a dwelling and its yard) of a residence with a 
new law that allowed gun owners to use “force if they felt threatened, not 
only in their homes but also if they’re in their vehicle or places of 
business.”150  
2. The open-carry law allows gun owners to visibly show their holstered gun 
in a variety of public places.151   
3. In 2015, Texas legislators suspended a law that prohibited carrying 
concealed weapons on college campuses by enacting a law that authorized 
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Advocacy groups press on as the most recent changes to support the Texan gun 
rights culture include a continued reduction in gun-free zones (for example, churches) and 
the ability for Texans who legally own firearms to openly carry or conceal their weapons 
for an entire week after the state declares an emergency.153 These continued pro-Second 
Amendment legislative changes, along with a household gun ownership rate of 44 percent, 
suspend any legislation that proposes gun restrictions in offering a solution to school 
shooting events.154 
Regrettably, while data-driven, bipartisan opportunities exist to enact violence 
prevention measures and legislative policies, they are often snuffed out by the gun 
debate.155 Scholars like Andrew Morral with the RAND Corporation highlight the lack of 
scientific studies regarding efforts to criminalize firearms, which calls into question the 
efficacy of this type of measure.156 In times when large segments of the population and 
the political arena plead for less police involvement and more social support, relying on 
criminalization as a solution to a complex problem runs counter to the contemporary 
narrative to defund the police and shift funds to social programs.  
The lack of popularity in modifying the Second Amendment, regulatory challenges, 
and the lack of scientific backing lead to governmental inaction, thus creating a continuous 
loop of violence, gun debate, and inaction.157 Abolishing or modifying the Second 
Amendment of the United States has divided the nation, making the debate a highly 
polarized issue that lacks common ground. In addition to being a deeply rooted issue, the 
efficacy of banning firearms is questionable. There are approximately 390 million legally 
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possessed firearms in the United States, and Texas has the highest number of registered 
weapons of any state, with over 725,000 firearms.158 Given these statistics, the prospect 
of seizing all firearms from every home is a daunting, if not impossible, regulatory task.  
Even if it were possible, criminals and those who wish to cause harm would still 
find weapons, as evident by the drug trade. Cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin are all 
illegal substances, but transnational organizations continue to make billions selling drugs 
to Americans. If firearms were illegal, what would keep transnational criminal 
organizations with existing smuggling methods and supply chains from becoming 
distributors of illegal firearms? Additionally, the increase in seizures of “ghost guns,” or 
unregistered firearms with no serial numbers, is becoming a growing problem in California, 
the state with the most strict gun legislation.159 San Diego County saw a 200 percent 
increase in ghost gun seizures between 2017 and 2018.160 Another emerging issue relates 
to modern advancements in 3D printing, which now includes the printing of metal 
components and will make regulation even more difficult.161 The aforementioned 
examples question the efficacy of more regulations, which are likely to do little to keep 
law violators from finding illicit ways to acquire firearms.  
Research from the RAND Corporation describes how the gun policy debate 
contains “sharply divided views” among gun policy experts, and “there is very little 
scientific evidence available to support the decisions that policymakers and the public must 
make about whether to implement or change various gun policies.”162 Instead of 
advocating for gun reform, Texas should look at policies and methods that are evidence-
based and implementable and have bipartisan support. The next section provides an 
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example of a currently proposed bill, The TAPS ACT, which aligns with these 
characteristics.  
C. THE TAPS ACT 
The Threat Assessment, Prevention, and Safety (TAPS) Act was introduced by 
Representative Brian Babin of Texas on January 29, 2019, and it aims to bring awareness, 
expertise, and best practices in recommended behavioral threat assessments and 
management to American communities.163 The target audiences for this legislation are law 
enforcement, school officials, and communities. Applying known threat assessment and 
management strategies that are used to protect high-level politicians, dignitaries, and 
celebrities to the local level can be achieved through awareness training (learning about 
warning signs of violence) and by developing mechanisms for reporting and managing 
behaviors ahead of violence (aligning limited resources where they are needed the 
most).164 The bill calls for the formation of task forces composed of subject-matter experts 
who will use a multidisciplinary team approach to formulate a national strategy aimed at 
preventing acts of targeted violence through behavioral threat assessment and 
management. In addition to developing a road map to prevent violence, the TAPS Act will 
generate grant opportunities to help fund and implement threat assessment programs 
among stakeholders, including local communities.  
Striking a balance between miscalculating potential dangers and overreacting can 
be achieved through awareness and proper management strategies.165 An American 
Psychological Association study has suggested that many threats are not reported because 
individuals exposed to threatening behavior do not take the threat seriously.166 A 
University of Virginia study sheds light on the lack of reporting concerning behaviors by 
students: 
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In a more recent study of more than 3,750 high school students, University 
of Virginia psychologists found that even when students were personally 
threatened, they tended to keep mum. Among the 12 percent of students 
who reported being threatened at school, only 26 percent told a higher up, 
such as a teacher or school officer.167 
Another study, which examined the National Police Foundation’s means of tracking 
incidents of averted school violence, concludes that several attacks were avoided because 
witnesses reported concerning behaviors—suggesting that recognizing and reporting 
concerning behaviors can prevent violence.168 
Participation in the TAPS Act is voluntary, the act is not a “red flag” firearm 
prohibition law, and there are no provisions for modifying the U.S. Bill of Rights. As of 
May 31, 2020, the bill has strong bipartisan support with 180 co-sponsors (90 Republicans 
and 90 Democrats).169 In addition to attaining bipartisan support, the TAPS Act was 
endorsed by the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP), the nation’s 
leading behavioral threat assessment and management association.170 
A comparative analysis with Switzerland, a country with a high rate of firearm 
ownership but a low number of incidents of targeted violence, offers valuable lessons that 
the United States should consider. 
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: THE ZURICH MODEL 
There are approximately 3.4 million privately owned firearms in Switzerland, a 
country with a total population of approximately 8.5 million.171 However, unlike the 
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United States, mass shootings have not been frequent occurrences in Switzerland.172 The 
National Rifle Association (NRA) often cites Switzerland as an example to highlight that 
gun ownership does not equate to more violence, but the NRA fails to describe the factors 
that differentiate Switzerland from the United States.173  
There are multiple differences between Switzerland and the United States, 
including how firearms are viewed in both countries. In Switzerland, children often train 
with firearms by joining gun clubs where they learn regulations and firearm safety 
protocols.174 Once they become adults, able-bodied males—except for conscientious 
objectors—serve in the country’s military, where they receive additional firearms 
training.175 The level of training alone and the national security objectives significantly 
differ from the United States because firearm training in Switzerland is structured, and 
civilian firearm possession is not intended for personal defense purposes. If a citizen wishes 
to possess a firearm for personal protection, he or she must make a case to show that 
protection is needed.176  
Another often-overlooked component to Switzerland’s gun approach is the 
implementation of a strong process to vet firearm possession, which is proactive and 
designed to keep individuals who show tendencies toward violence, criminal histories, and 
psychological issues from possessing firearms. Furthermore, local law enforcement 
agencies in Switzerland are responsible for assessing firearm applicants for weapon 
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possession suitability, which in some cases includes consultation with a mental health 
professional at one’s own cost before a license to carry is approved.177 
Despite having structured training, robust vetting protocols, and different gun 
culture, Switzerland has also experienced incidents of targeted violence. On September 27, 
2001, Switzerland became the scene of a targeted violence event when a disgruntled 
citizen, involved in a three-year conflict with authorities, resorted to violence as a means 
to address his grievance.178 The shooter, Friedrich Leibacher, entered a parliament 
building armed with multiple firearms and homemade explosives, killing 14 people before 
committing suicide.179 Jérôme Endrass et al. highlight the importance of focusing on 
warning signs and collaboration: “A psychiatric expert opinion commissioned after the 
killings concluded that, although Leibacher displayed very peculiar behavior long before 
the assault, the danger he presented did not become clearly evident until all the information 
regarding his past and recent behavior was put together.”180 Despite being in a different 
country, Leibacher’s assessment of evaluating the totality of behaviors highlights a 
commonality with the school shooting incidents highlighted in this thesis. 
A Swiss local government approach in Zurich highlights the importance of focusing 
on preventive measures by actively managing situations involving individuals in the 
juvenile and adult criminal system who display concerning or threatening behaviors. In 
such cases, a multi-disciplinary team comprising of forensic experts and a case manager 
work to “gather all available information . . . to assess the risk for violence and propose 
intervention strategies.”181The Swiss process is not based on profiling or predictions. It 
uses a data-driven approach to collect information and share it with all stakeholders; in the 
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case of a student threat, information from parents, teachers, and witnesses are reviewed to 
develop a robust risk assessment. Once risks are identified, the objective is to develop risk-
mitigation strategies that are driven by “the needs of the offender.”182 The Zurich Model 
exemplifies the importance of implementing management strategies that directly align 
resources with the needs of the individual they are trying to assist. By conducting a granular 
assessment of behavioral causation, threat managers recognize behavioral triggers and 
grounding factors, to implement tailored threat management plans that are designed to keep 
concerning behaviors from reoccurring.  Psychopathology, behavioral dispositions, threat 
assessment, and protective factors are essential components leveraged by the Zurich Model 
to prevent crime and reduce recidivism.183 
E. CONCLUSION 
The lesson from Switzerland does not pertain to societal differences or per capita 
firearm ownership between Swiss and American populations but rather to the ways in 
which the Swiss derive opportunities to prevent violence by adopting preventive initiatives 
and considering support strategies instead of looking to punishment as a cure for all evils. 
Like the United States, Switzerland is not immune to the gun debate, but as the debate 
rages over firearms, some Swiss authorities are taking a serious approach to implement 
multidisciplinary teams tasked with assessing and managing risks ahead of violence. 
Sensible action over inertia is the applicable lesson the United States should learn from 
Switzerland. 
Threat assessment is not a new concept in America, threat assessment and 
management practices are being used by multiple federal agencies, and more and more 
states are adopting threat assessment and management practices. Texas already took an 
essential step in recognizing the importance of enacting preventive measures, but adopting 
legislative action that supports the use of a practical behavioral threat assessment and 
management process through proper case management, privacy rights alignment, and 
proper information sharing practices is equally if not more important—as demonstrated by 
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the acts of violence outlined in Chapter II. In order to identify gaps and measure efficacy, 
it is important to understand existing legislation and recommended practices set forth by 
Texas legislation. Chapter IV analyzes existing Texas threat assessment mandates outlined 
in S.B. 11, the Texas governor’s recommended use of fusion centers for threat assessment 
practices, and privacy considerations associated with student and medical records.  
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IV. TEXAS SCHOOL SAFETY LEGISLATION, FUSION
CENTERS, AND PRIVACY RIGHTS 
Truth, like love and sleep, resents approaches that are too intense. 
—W. H. Auden184 
This chapter explores current Texas school safety legislation, the Texas governor’s 
orders pertaining to school safety, and their alignment with the student records privacy law 
(FERPA) and medical records privacy law (HIPAA). As with other acts of violence 
outlined in Chapter II, Texas highlights the reactive rather than proactive nature of school 
safety and security policy. Most of the recommended practices cited in S.B. 11 had been 
previously outlined by other states that experienced incidents of school violence, but as 
with many cases, tragedy preceded meaningful action. Instead of continuing to promote a 
cycle of school safety legislation that follows tragedy, it is important for government 
officials and school districts to prioritize school safety and security measures by enacting 
proactive measures. Prioritizing school safety and security involves implementing ongoing 
mechanisms that assess the execution of recommendations and guidelines for efficacy so 
that adjustments and corrections can be measured by tangible means. It may never be 
possible for schools to be 100 percent safe, but that does not mean policy and processes 
should strive to make schools as safe as possible. 
By reviewing existing measures, laws, and proposals, this chapter analyzes the 
effectiveness of Texas school safety initiatives by outlining program details, available 
opportunities, and important considerations regarding privacy rights and community 
involvement. 
A. TEXAS SENATE BILL 11
In 2019, the Texas Legislature passed Texas S.B. 11 into law after Texas Governor
Greg Abbott recommended the implementation of multiple school safety and security 
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initiatives that included preventive and responsive measures intended to promote school 
safety.185 Governor Abbott developed his school safety and security action plan after 
conducting a series of meetings with school safety and security experts following the 
shooting at Santa Fe High School in Texas.186 The following school safety measures are 
outlined in S.B. 11: 
• Increase school safety funding;  
• Increase school physical security;  
• Add additional law enforcement and security personnel;  
• Arm trained school staff through state-approved programs;  
• Increase training in emergency management;  
• Standardize emergency operations plan development;  
• Promote information sharing with law enforcement;  
• Implement school safety and security committees composed of multiple 
stakeholders;  
• Increase mental health support for students; and 
• Implement behavioral threat assessment and threat management 
processes.187 
S.B. 11 is significant because it elevated the posture of school safety and security measures 
by applying what had been recommended: mandated practices.188 However, the increased 
posture in safety and security has not been free of implementation issues.  
The rush to gain compliance with a holistic approach to school safety and security 
caused delays in implementation, ultimately resulting in an extension of regulatory 
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compliance due dates from the 2019–2020 to the 2020–2021 school year.189 The need for 
an extension is an important marker as it conflicts with previously submitted survey 
responses intended to assess the posture of school safety in Texas.190 Despite the school 
safety survey conducted in 2016—which indicated that many school districts had taken 
significant steps toward safety and security—an extension was still needed to meet the 
requirements of S.B. 11. Additionally, the survey did not have a measuring mechanism that 
separated compliance assumptions from actuality.191 This finding raises the question of 
whether the survey’s designers were checking for a degree of compliance versus efficacy 
in safety and security measures or if the survey respondents had the required level of 
expertise to answer the survey correctly. Survey respondents claimed that physical security 
measures, emergency management initiatives, and a security or law enforcement presence 
were already in place to varying degrees in the Texas school system.192  
However, the same could not be stated about behavioral threat assessment, which 
for most districts, has been a novel component of school safety and security.193 To 
implement and deliver best practices in behavioral threat assessment and management to 
Texas public schools, a research center at Texas State University was selected to function 
as a clearinghouse for all school-based safety and security initiatives outlined in S.B. 11.194 
The Texas School Safety Center is part of the Texas governor’s strategic homeland security 
plan, with statutory education code authority to provide school safety and security training 
and accountability measures to all public schools in Texas.195  
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1. Behavioral Threat Assessment Training 
To standardize a training baseline for threat assessment and management in the 
state, the Texas School Safety Center selected SIGMA Threat Management, a private threat 
assessment and management company, as the training provider for every school district in 
Texas.196 Attending SIGMA’s threat assessment training is a statutory requirement to be 
compliant with S.B. 11.197 This training highlights the importance of threat assessment 
and management and instructs school officials to “identify, investigate, assess and 
intervene in cases of threats and other alarming behavior.”198  
The Texas School Safety Center took an essential step in recognizing the 
significance of enacting preventive school safety measures, and the state’s approach to 
making threat assessment training a mandate highlights the importance of behavioral threat 
assessment initiatives in Texas. However, each school district is entitled to select its own 
threat assessment model, and there are no standardized mechanisms currently in place to 
measure the effectiveness of threat assessment programs in Texas.199 Providing consistent 
and mandated baseline threat assessment training was an essential step, but the 
development of threat assessment programs, case management functions, and efficacy 
outcomes is governed entirely by individual school districts—which makes auditing Texas 
school districts for the effectiveness of these functions a daunting task indeed. This process, 
as with the 2016 survey, may lead to positive results on paper that may lack fidelity.  
Focusing on the implementation rather than the effectiveness of a threat assessment 
program is problematic, so the Texas School Safety Center should consider establishing 
strong auditing mechanisms. The school shootings at Arapahoe High School in Colorado 
and Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Florida, as outlined in Chapter II, 
exemplify that having a behavioral threat assessment program that is not effectively 
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managed might meet recommended guidelines and legislative mandates but will do very 
little to prevent acts of violence.  
2. Forming Multidisciplinary Teams 
An essential component of developing an effective behavioral threat assessment 
program is emphasizing collaboration and forming multidisciplinary teams composed of 
individuals with different but relevant expertise and experiences.200 The application of 
multidisciplinary teams in behavioral threat assessment is vital because professionals with 
diverse backgrounds and expertise can effectively assess dynamic circumstances that 
comprise multiple variables. In summary, outcomes are enhanced by leveraging 
partnerships that cultivate various opinions and perspectives toward solving a problem. In 
some cases, a simple change of environment may resolve the problem. This will require 
more action from a school administrator. In other cases, social issues may be the primary 
contributing factor, so leveraging the expertise of a social worker will be more effective, 
and the same is true regarding the role of law enforcement in cases where security issues 
are greater. This team approach helps to avoid groupthink; it builds trust among 
stakeholders and promotes communication across disciplines.  
The creation of multi-disciplinary teams has been emphasized by SIGMA training 
and by guidelines published by the Texas School Safety Center. The Texas School Safety 
Center also provides extensive information about the importance of behavioral threat 
assessment teams by outlining recommended practices and guidelines. A crucial 
component is the recommendation to create an accountability mechanism through district-
level oversight teams that govern campus-level teams. The cycle depicted in Figure 3 
demonstrates the various disciplines that make up school-based behavioral threat 
assessment teams. 
 




Figure 3. Example of a School-Based Threat Assessment 
Multidisciplinary Team 
3. Governor Abbot’s Executive Orders 
In Texas, the merits of instituting proactive violence prevention mechanisms are 
expanding beyond the school sector, which is evident by Governor Abbott’s issuance of 
eight executive orders in September 2019 following non–school-related acts of targeted 
violence in El Paso and Odessa, Texas.201 The executive orders were intended to stimulate 
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violence prevention measures with practices that have multidisciplinary and information 
sharing components similar to the Zurich model, as outlined in Chapter III.202 A review of 
Governor Abbott’s executive orders is warranted as it brings to light what might become 
legislation. As previously discussed in this chapter, Governor Abbott’s 2018 school safety 
action plan became legislation through S.B. 11. The executive orders outlined below 
promote partnerships between multiple disciplines, organizations, and community 
members, which further encourage a joint stakeholder (whole-community approach) to 
prevent violence.  
Table 2. Texas Governor Abbott:  Executive Orders, 2018203 
 
Order number 5 is significant because it establishes a foundation for 
communication between the state’s education agency authority—the Texas Education 
Agency—and the largest law enforcement agency in Texas—the Texas Department of 
Public Safety. 
Order number 6 highlights the importance of a multidisciplinary approach that 
involves mental health professionals, school professionals, and law enforcement, and it 
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extends beyond the local and regional levels by promoting partnerships with federal 
authorities. 
Order number 7 recommends that fusion centers—law enforcement central hubs of 
information where suspected criminal and threatening information is “received, analyzed, 
gathered and shared among law enforcement agencies and the private sector”204—should 
be used to conduct assessments of digital and social media for concerning behaviors and 
threats online.205 By serving as a conduit of information, fusion centers work to avoid silos 
of communication through information and resource sharing with the intent of elevating 
the U.S. homeland security posture.206 This executive order mandates that the network of 
seven fusion centers in Texas improve school safety by investigating threatening behaviors 
online, particularly through suspicious activity reports, which contain a public-facing 
reporting tool that provides a venue for submission of criminal and threatening 
information.207 
The aforementioned orders highlight a shift in response from reactive law 
enforcement practices, whereby law enforcement becomes involved after a criminal 
offense, to a proactive posture, whereby concerns are reported early on. This change in 
strategy is relevant, as the lack of social support and mental health care—an absence of 
systems to understand what drives criminal behavior—has been overlooked in the United 
States while law enforcement and the judicial system have become the “solution” by 
exacting consequences for complex trauma, social and mental health problems.208 The 
next section evaluates the role of fusion centers and behavioral threat assessment by 
assessing similarities and challenges between fusion centers and behavioral threat 
assessment functions.  
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B. FUSION CENTERS AND BEHAVIORAL THREAT ASSESSMENT  
Governor Abbott’s Executive Order 7 was not the first time he referenced the use 
of fusion centers to help promote school safety, which is indicative of how the state plans 
to prevent violence proactively. In August 2019, Governor Abbott issued a new school 
safety report that recommended the use of fusion centers in Texas to prevent school 
violence. Governor Abbott’s report states that fusion centers have been “successful in using 
predictive information to apprehend people who pose possible threats to schools”; 
however, careful consideration should be given when relating “predictive” practices with 
behavioral threat assessment.209 The objective of behavioral threat assessment is to 
develop preventive strategies by identifying and assessing both risks and mitigating factors 
so that a risk reduction strategy can be implemented if needed.210 An effective threat 
assessment program seeks objective facts to facilitate data-driven decisions instead of 
applying professional judgment or predictive conclusions. John Van Dreal, a school 
psychologist and expert in the field of school-based behavioral threat assessment and 
management, describes the importance of implementing fact-finding protocols, so effective 
solutions can be crafted to specific needs: 
The cornerstone of this work is a protocol that emphasizes fact-finding and 
takes anxiety and other strong emotions out of the equation so teams can 
focus on identifying evidence-based, culturally responsive solutions that 
match the risk factors. This perspective is based on the belief that potential 
problems can be prevented and that with the right interventions, students 
can learn to make safe behavioral choices.211 
Van Dreal’s description of school-based behavioral threat assessment and the 
application of solutions that match risk factors does not appear to align with law 
enforcement work at first glance, primarily due to the reactive nature of law enforcement. 
Law enforcement work often entails matching conduct with a criminal statute; however, 
there are several components of fusion center practices that complement and align with 
behavioral threat assessment work. The following example of the Northern California 
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Regional Intelligence Center illustrates this symbiosis through its process similarities and 
challenges.  
1. Process Similarities 
The makeup of fusion centers comprises non–law enforcement positions, including 
crime and intelligence analysts, subject-matter experts, emergency managers, 
cybersecurity professionals, and private-sector partners that collectively support the 
homeland security enterprise through a multidisciplinary approach.212 The application of 
a joint stakeholder, multidisciplinary approach, is closely related to behavioral threat 
assessment practices. Executive Director Mike Sena of the Northern California Regional 
Intelligence Center testified before the House Committee of Homeland Security in 2016 
about the merits of information sharing and the role fusion centers have in crime prevention 
strategies.213 The process of collecting information, analyzing it, and assessing risk are 
closely related to threat assessment, whereby risk behaviors are recognized, reported, 
assessed, and managed through effective intervention practices. The concept of seeking 
information and using data to facilitate investigations is an effective element of preventing 
school violence through behavioral threat assessment and management. 
Another essential similarity relates to recognizing the importance of privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties. In this connection, the Northern California Regional Intelligence 
Center exemplifies the importance of privacy rights considerations by enacting policies 
that protect civil rights and freedoms and making the preservation of constitutionally 
protected rights a part of its mission: 
To protect life, critical infrastructure, key resources, privacy, civil rights, 
and civil liberties through information sharing, analysis, criminal 
intelligence and technology that focuses a whole of government and 
community approach to identify, prevent, protect against, mitigate, and 
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assist in the response to and the recovery from the greatest human-made 
threats and major hazards in the Federal Northern District of California.214 
Furthermore, a public-facing privacy statement posted on the Center’s web page outlines 
the “policies and procedures regarding the manner in which information is collected, 
received, maintained, archived, accessed or disclosed.”215 The emphasis placed on 
prioritizing privacy, information sharing, and civil liberties should serve as a model to other 
fusion centers in Texas and throughout the United States. This balanced framework 
highlights that proactive security measures do not have to be at odds with privacy rights 
and civil liberties.  
2. Process Challenges 
The concern for potential discrimination of protected groups and privacy 
infringements is likely an impediment to the role of fusion centers in school-based 
behavioral threat assessment.216 Concerns over having children added to law enforcement 
databases may keep reporting parties from contacting law enforcement in fear that rather 
than helping, law enforcement may arrest a student who needs help. Florida, despite good 
intentions, exemplifies the reality associated with this type of concern.217 In February 
2020, a five-year-old boy was added to a law enforcement threat database for saying, “ I 
wish someone killed you” to another student.218 Unfortunately, his name will remain in 
this database well into his adulthood.219 Children say inappropriate things, which 
highlights the critical importance for threat managers to evaluate the context of each 
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situation—simply voicing threatening words should not amount to entering a child into a 
law enforcement database for years and potentially staining the child’s records for what is 
otherwise considered normal childhood behavior. Sharing student records with law 
enforcement should be a practice only implemented when credible safety risks are present. 
Concerns over law enforcement overreach have been compounded by the current 
anti-law enforcement climate, following the killing of George Floyd by a police officer, 
which intensified the level of distrust in criminal justice practices.220 Significant 
consideration should be given to promote privacy and eliminate discrimination—or the 
perception of discrimination—because, without trust, students, parents, and the general 
public will be less likely to report concerning or threatening behaviors for fear of bringing 
unjust treatment to individuals who display them. The distrust issue is not unique to law 
enforcement, as evident by a history of disparities in the application of school disciplinary 
actions in the American public education system.221 A Government Accountability Office 
study of the 2013–2014 school year found that minority students were subjected to 
disciplinary consequences at alarming rates: 
These disparities were widespread and persisted regardless of the type of 
disciplinary action, level of school poverty, or type of public school 
attended. For example, Black students accounted for 15.5 percent of all 
public school students, but represented about 39 percent of students 
suspended from school—an overrepresentation of about 23 percentage 
points.222 
The use of predictive terminology in describing the role of fusion centers has 
already prompted a response from privacy rights groups about practices “similar to the 
2002 Steven Spielberg film, Minority Report,” which solved cases before the criminal act 
was committed, “based on pre-knowledge provided by psychics.”223 As previously stated, 
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behavioral threat assessment does not incorporate predictive analysis, and such 
assumptions help illustrate the need to educate the community, law enforcement, and 
government officials regarding what behavioral threat assessment is. Amelia Vance, senior 
counsel and director of education privacy at the Future of Privacy Forum, highlights the 
importance of applying effective behavioral threat assessment practices: 
You have students who have gone through the threat assessment process, 
which is intended to make things better for students . . . but what we’ve seen 
is, in some cases, these threat assessments are discriminating against 
students with autism or students with disabilities. . . . Those students aren’t 
threats, they’re simply students who need additional help.224 
Vance’s statement offers a valuable message about the role of law enforcement in 
behavioral threat assessment practices: threat assessment is not a replacement for legal 
consequences but a careful review of facts that includes other perspectives from different 
professionals who may help explain what is causing the threatening behavior. The 
complexities of human conduct require thorough analysis, and applying the same tool, 
which often equates with trying to match a threat with a criminal nexus, may not be the 
most effective way to deal with risk behavior.225  
In addition to understanding the role of fusion centers as well as their symbiosis 
and challenges with behavioral threat assessment, ensuring that the privacy rights of 
students are protected is an essential component to information sharing practices. FERPA 
and HIPPA regulations were put in place to ensure privacy rights were protected; however, 
a broad understanding is necessary for the administration of the behavioral threat 
assessment process.  
 
224 Amelia Vance, “ICYMI: FPF’s Amelia Vance Raises Concerns about School Surveillance 
Technologies on WOSU,” Future of Privacy Forum, August 28, 2019, https://fpf.org/2019/08/28/icymi-
privacy-expert-raises-concerns-about-school-surveillance-technologies/. 
225 Dewey G. Cornell et al., Prevention v. Punishment: Threat Assessment, School Suspensions, and 
Racial Disparities (Charlottesville: University of Virginia and Legal Aid Justice Center, 2013), 
https://www.justice4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Prevention-v-Punishment-Report-FINAL.pdf. 
60 
3. Privacy Considerations: FERPA and HIPAA 
Hindsight after a tragedy has shown that often one or more individuals surrounding 
the perpetrator had some foreknowledge of concerning behaviors that may serve as 
violence indicators. When school administrators, counselors, or teachers were the ones who 
noticed these behaviors, the reason they did not report such behaviors often entangled with 
a misunderstanding of privacy laws, namely FERPA and HIPAA. These regulations are 
important protections that must be understood and given the appropriate weight in the 
circumstances involving safety and security. Rather than being impediments to behavior 
threat assessment, FERPA and HIPAA help guide threat assessment practitioners in 
developing policies that promote privacy without compromising safety. 
FERPA is a federal law that was created to govern access to student education 
records.226 These rights govern academic transcripts, disciplinary records, standardized 
test results, health records, family records, and services provided for students with 
disabilities. In standard settings, only “school officials with a legitimate educational 
interest” are authorized to view FERPA-protected education records.227 However, FERPA 
recognizes that FERPA-protected information “can be released without prior consent in an 
emergency when the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student 
or other persons.”228 The information may be shared only with persons who can do 
something about the safety concern, “appropriate parties” who may include law 
enforcement and healthcare professionals.229 
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HIPAA “is a federal law that protects the privacy of individually identifiable health 
information.”230 In many cases, the privacy of student health records is protected by 
FERPA rather than HIPAA because the latter applies to health care providers. A school 
may be defined as a health care provider, according to HIPAA, depending on the level of 
services provided to the student.231 A critical consideration when conducting school-based 
behavioral threat assessment is that—as with FERPA—HIPAA does not impede 
behavioral threat assessment practices.232 HIPAA also contains a safety exception that 
authorizes the disclosure of protected health information to law enforcement if the release 
of such information is needed to prevent or reduce the safety risks of the protected 
individual or others.233 The Department of Education addresses privacy rights 
considerations, including applicable exceptions for behavioral threat assessment teams, 
explicitly. On its website, the Department of Education cites examples of acceptable and 
unacceptable information sharing scenarios. The use of scenarios makes the information 
digestible to larger segments of the community as legal statutes can be challenging to 
understand.234 
Despite such concepts being clearly defined, many educators continue to make 
assumptions about the application of privacy rights in the face of safety concerns. In 2018, 
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Reports analyzing recent campus shootings observe that educators in 
Colorado and elsewhere often misunderstand the scope and meaning of 
FERPA. Teachers and administrators fear that by responding proactively to 
threats of school violence, they may run afoul of federal privacy laws. This 
[Coffman’s] Opinion seeks to dispel these misunderstandings and to 
prevent unfounded privacy concerns from hampering school violence 
prevention.235 
The ability to share information based on a safety nexus should not be a foreign 
process to Texas law enforcement and educators. Texas legislation mandates notifications 
of certain violations, both criminal and administrative, to promote safe school 
environments through awareness. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 15.27, 
mandates notification to school officials within 24 hours if a student is arrested for a felony, 
assaultive behavior, or other offense, including drug, violence, or weapons charges. School 
districts are required to notify educators and support staff who have regular contact with 
the student.236  
The Texas Education Code, § 37.006–37.007, mandates that educators and support 
staff receive notification of students under their supervision who are subject to expulsion 
or temporary placement on a disciplinary alternative program for false alarms; threats 
against a school; crimes within 300 feet of a school, including felony, violence, sex, and 
drug charges; retaliation against a school staff member; weapons charges on school 
property; and certain alcohol-related offenses.237 School districts can be sanctioned for 
failing to notify staff members, and staff members are bound to maintain confidentiality 
regarding student arrest notifications per their Texas State Board of Education 
certification.238  
The above examples are provided to highlight two laws that currently promote 
safety in Texas: 1) school districts may provide information to specified staff under FERPA 
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and HIPAA safety exceptions if a risk to the safety of the individuals or others can be 
articulated, and 2) law enforcement is required to provide student arrest information to 
schools, and schools are required to share disciplinary issues with staff when discipline 
involves certain violations that trigger expulsion or alternative placement. Both policies 
are designed to promote classroom safety. Nevertheless, no laws, legislation, or codes 
currently mandate the sharing of concerning behaviors or threat assessment data that do 
not amount to criminal offenses.  
If educators, parents, and students view school-based behavioral threat assessment 
as a proactive process that identifies causes of concerning behaviors so that supportive 
strategies to prevent violence can be developed, the result may be increased reporting of 
concerning behaviors, which will help eliminate silos of information that are not typically 
identified until after tragedy strikes. O’Toole has described the importance of educating 
students in recognizing and reporting threats of violence to avoid “code of silence” 
behavior for fear of being labeled a “snitch.”239 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter detailed measures implemented in Texas to increase the safety and 
security posture of public schools in the state. It revealed that despite significant progress 
in both preventive and responsive measures, gaps remain, particularly in the 
implementation and execution of threat assessment functions. These gaps are created by 
the state’s current hands-off approach in the development of processes, case management, 
and information-sharing functions, which are currently left by individual school districts 
to develop. With various threat screening processes being used by different districts, 
attaining an accurate assessment of the efficacy of behavioral threat assessment and 
management functions as a violence prevention tool will be a challenging task for the Texas 
School Safety Center. As it currently stands, the emphasis is placed on initiating programs 
rather than initiating effective programs, which in the past has resulted in tragedy. 
Additional opportunities exist in defining the role fusion centers should have in promoting 
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school safety. In this context, this chapter argues that fusion centers should not conflate 
“predictive” practices with behavioral threat assessment functions, and creating large 
databases with student threat assessment and disciplinary records will likely corrode public 
trust and community involvement. Defining the role of fusion centers in behavioral threat 
assessment and management more objectively will help clarify a significant gap in what 
their mission, scope, and limitations should be in supporting school safety and security. 
Another reason to set clear policies and boundaries is to balance strong safety measures 
with privacy rights and civil liberties. Framing policy and processes using a holistic 
approach will help promote legitimacy in the development of school safety and security 
frameworks. To attain this balance, school-based behavioral threat assessment teams 
should have a clear understanding of FERPA and HIPAA safety exception clauses. This 
chapter has highlighted that failing to do so will likely impede communication, which in 
turn leads to inaction. 
By acknowledging existing opportunities through research and analysis and the 
implications of reactive school safety measures, Chapter V sheds light on sensible 
recommendations that should be leveraged to enhance proactive school safety and security 
measures. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
I wish everyone would realize that if students and staff do not make it home 
alive to their families at the end of the day, nothing else matters. 
Implementing school security best practices—starting with the basics—has 
to be a priority. 
  —Max Schachter240 
This thesis sought to identify proper behavioral threat assessment and information 
sharing practices to promote school safety and security without compromising existing 
privacy rights. It found that for behavioral threat assessment and management to be an 
effective violence prevention strategy, school officials and legislators should develop 
programs and implement training and measurement tools that focus on efficacy rather than 
compliance or broad measures that consequentially affect children who do not pose a 
threat. This thesis determined that behavioral threat assessment practices should leverage 
the collective power of multiple stakeholders, ensure accurate understanding of existing 
privacy rights to guide information sharing practices, develop proper case management 
protocols, and implement policies that ensure beneficial information is not lost as a child 
moves from school to school.  
Through a review of Texas and federal legislation, this thesis found both valuable 
elements as well as opportunities to enhance safety and security measures aimed at 
preventing school violence. Texas took an essential step in increasing proactive school 
safety and security, which is evident in mandated school-based behavioral threat 
assessment and management practices within the state’s public education system.241 Texas 
also implemented a standardized training program that contains a tracking mechanism to 
assess who completed the training and which school districts are compliant with this 
mandate.242 Furthermore, the Texas School Safety Center announced a plan to collect 
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baseline threat assessment data to assess training, program implementation, and the number 
of threats assessed using behavioral threat assessment and management.243 Currently, 
there are no reporting systems or legislative mandates in Texas for assessing the efficacy 
of behavioral threat assessment in preventing violence. The Texas School Safety Center 
has not announced whether data efficacy reporting will be introduced in the future; 
however, having performance mechanisms to assess program efficacy will help identify 
opportunities to improve and expand school-based behavioral threat assessment and 
management practices. Despite making significant strides in proactive school safety and 
security, to date, little guidance has been provided regarding how to conduct proper case 
management and information sharing processes.244 Through research, this thesis has 
identified existing gaps that should be addressed sooner rather than later because failure to 
do so will likely impact desired outcomes.  
The primary audiences for the recommendations provided in this chapter are Texas 
legislators, school district leadership, governing bodies, mental health professionals, and 
school safety and security professionals. Nevertheless, several recommendations outlined 
in this chapter may be applied at a national level. Ultimately, this thesis has drawn valuable 
lessons about school violence prevention by assessing contributing factors to school 
violence and the ways in which different states and school districts responded to school 
violence.  
The recommendations in this chapter are not intended to be all-encompassing. 
Instead, this chapter outlines a roadmap that can be used to increase the safety and security 
posture of schools. The recommendations are divided into three segments: local-level 
recommendations, which should be considered by school district leadership and school 
safety and security professionals; Texas legislation amendments, which should be 
considered by Texas legislators and the Texas Education Agency; and federal-level 
legislation adoption, which should be considered by the U.S. House of Representatives. 
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A. TEXAS LOCAL-LEVEL RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management 
This preventive process is a mandatory component of school safety in Texas, and 
this research has shed light on the importance of developing programs that emphasize 
prevention rather than response. With behavioral threat assessment and management being 
a mandate in Texas, school districts should focus on developing effective programs rather 
than working merely to meet legislative compliance. For example, the school district in 
Broward County had implemented a behavioral threat assessment process, but after the 
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting, investigators learned of confusion 
among the staff, and threat managers were unfamiliar with their own processes.245 The 
tragedy at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School exemplifies the need for school 
administrators and individuals assigned to threat management teams to receive ongoing 
training and develop mechanisms designed to assess the efficacy of their initiatives. 
Additionally, training should not be reserved for threat managers. School districts should 
provide tools to encourage reporting of concerning behaviors anonymously; all staff 
members should be trained in how to recognize and report risk behavior, and community 
members and parents must also be trained and encouraged to report risk behavior.246 By 
leveraging the collective power of staff, parents, students, and the community, school 
districts increase their chances to move individuals from escalating on the pathway to 
targeted violence. The goal is to de-escalate concerning behaviors by leveraging available 
support functions, including behavioral therapists, social-emotional learning tools, 
counseling services, positive relationships, and, when appropriate, psychiatric therapy 
support. By matching management strategies with the level of risk, effective behavioral 
threat assessment practices can be done with fidelity and without stigmatizing or labeling 
children. Using existing privacy rights and civil liberties as a guiding compass is a sound 
rule to follow.  
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2. Whole-Community Approach to Prevent Violence 
By educating entire communities, the opportunities to detect and act promptly 
increase. For example, a grandmother in Washington state was able to prevent a school 
shooting—the day before the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School—after 
discovering school shooting plans in her grandson’s journal and a rifle she did not know 
he possessed.247 The would-be shooter had been planning to conduct a school shooting at 
Aces High School, and some of his journal entries highlighted the desire to inflict violence: 
I need to make this shooting/bombing at Kamiak infamous. I need to get the 
biggest fatality number I possibly can. I need to make this count. I’ve been 
reviewing many mass shootings/bombings (and attempted bombings), I’m 
learning from past shooters/bombers mistakes, so I don’t make the same 
ones.248 
In addition to having ideations of violence, the would-be shooter escalated his behaviors 
by conducting research and acquiring weapons to prepare for the attack.249 After 
recognizing risk behaviors and discovering weapons, the grandmother called the police.250  
The process of involving all stakeholders creates a whole-community approach, 
which can effectively identify concerning behaviors early on.251 This type of approach is 
particularly appropriate for schools, where the student population consists of children with 
developing brains, hormonal changes, peer pressure, bullying, and exposure to substance 
abuse. Other stressors—including broken families, exposure to domestic violence, sexual 
abuse, and significant social-economic disparities—create an environment that, to specific 
groups, is conducive to violence.252 A critical function of a robust behavioral threat 
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assessment process is to determine whether a threat exists, not whether a threat was made. 
A school threat risk assessment is done by balancing all stressors and mitigating factors to 
assess whether an individual poses a threat. Threat managers should not look at single 
factors to determine risk. Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg describe the importance of 
context in analyzing terrorism: “While one context may be more important than another, 
there is almost never just a single context that is relevant to understanding an act of 
terrorism.”253 The same is true about a threat manager’s role in analyzing what constitutes 
a threat versus a perceived threat.  
In addition to preventive methods, school districts should implement a robust 
school safety and security framework that contains multiple layers of security aimed at 
protecting students from a variety of threats. Following the Marjory Stoneman Douglas 
shooting, David Ropeik noted, 
The chance of a child being shot and killed in a public school is 
extraordinarily low. Not zero—no risk is. But it’s far lower than many 
people assume, especially in the glare of heart-wrenching news coverage 
after an event like Parkland. And it’s far lower than almost any other 
mortality risk a kid faces, including traveling to and from school, catching 
a potentially deadly disease while in school or suffering a life-threatening 
injury playing interscholastic sports.254 
Parents expect their children to be safe when they send them to school, and relying on luck 
or low probabilities to protect children is not a defensible strategy. The research in this 
thesis identified that school leaders from campuses where school shootings occurred 
believed their school districts were safe places before tragedy arrived. The same low-
probability argument can be made about commercial air travel, which, compared to other 
forms of transportation, remains very safe, but what reduces the risk of air travel are robust 
safety and security measures.255  
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It is important to note that despite being an effective strategy, behavioral threat 
assessment and management are not a singular solution to school safety and security. As 
previously stated, school safety is a complex issue, and a multifaceted approach that 
contains multiple layers should be implemented to drive objectives. The incidents outlined 
in Chapter II of this thesis demonstrated multiple systemic failures that extended beyond 
threat assessment. Although outside the scope of this thesis, equal importance should be 
given to other measures, including implementing physical security, fostering a 
collaborative safety and security culture, and working with emergency management and 
law enforcement as components of a defined framework. If done correctly, along with 
behavioral threat assessment and management, the collective use of these measures will 
help promote an effective school safety and security ecosystem where each initiative is 
collectively balanced to build strength. 
B. TEXAS SENATE BILL 11 AMENDMENTS 
This thesis suggests that two amendments to S.B. 11 be considered. 
1. Threat Assessment Case Management Amendment 
The Texas School Safety Center published a tool kit guide, as discussed in Chapter 
I. A section in this document highlights the importance of case management: “Develop and 
implement a case management plan to reduce risk.”256 Despite outlining this guidance, the 
Texas School Safety Center offers no actionable representation of what an effective case 
management process looks like or how to gauge whether counseling and other risk behavior 
management strategies and interventions are working. Having accurate data that assess the 
impact of risk behavior management tools—such as social-emotional learning programs, 
safety plans, schedule changes, counseling services, and partnerships with parents in 
managing threats—is paramount. Failure to do so will, at best, skew data. At worst, it will 
lead to the mismanagement of risk reduction strategies, which will do little to prevent 
violence. Reid Meloy and Jens Hoffmann describe the fluid nature of behavioral threat 
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assessment with the following recommendation for school-based behavioral threat 
assessment teams: 
Given the dynamic process of unfolding cases, an important observation to 
keep in mind is that cases do not usually end but rather become dormant. 
This necessitates the creation of mechanisms for monitoring the episodic 
nature of risk, including subject escalation, de-escalation, 
institutionalization, involvement in legal proceedings, and release over 
time.257 
Behavioral threat assessment should not be viewed as a compliance checkmark but rather 
a fluid process unique to each individual case. What works for some may not work for all. 
Through reporting mechanisms, documentation, case management districts can promote 
legitimacy in their threat assessment programs.  
The legislative framework for behavioral threat assessment and case management 
in Texas should, at a minimum, include the following: 
1. A reporting function that is public-facing and promotes anonymous 
reporting; 
2. A workflow process that reaches the campus-level threat assessment team 
and the district-level threat assessment team for accountability and support 
purposes; 
3. A built-in follow-up cycle that warns campus and district-level teams of 
pending tasks and needed documentation; 
4. A records management process that allows campus-level teams to report if 
applied strategies are positively or negatively affecting risk behaviors; 
5. The ability to attach documents and support evidence to the records 
management system; and 
6. An inactive status, once the case is closed, whereby district-level team 
members can view files only for specified reasons. 
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Documentation is not a new concept to educators, and their familiarity with 
documenting, measuring, and using data to make decisions should be leveraged. The 
education system requires extensive documentation for attendance, academic performance; 
individualized education programs; and admission, review, and dismissal actions. 
Behavioral threat assessment should not be excluded from having a defined framework that 
governs how schools institute proper case management functions.  
Promoting symbiosis between existing school practices and individualized threat 
assessments is essential, and case management will help support individualized practices 
instead of a compliance bundle program. Talish Bond, a school psychologist, highlights 
the need for individualizing behavioral threat assessment programs: “My hope is the 
response to threats becomes more nuanced and more individualized, just like students with 
[individualized education programs]: Each one is unique to that child.”258 
2. Information Sharing Amendment 
This thesis already described privacy safety exceptions contained in FERPA and 
HIPAA and how failure to communicate with law enforcement and other stakeholders 
when safety concerns are present can become contributing factors to violence, as 
exemplified in the Virginia Tech case in Chapter II. The focus of this recommendation is 
narrower and prioritizes school-to-school information sharing within Texas. Rather than 
sharing all threat assessment information with fusion centers and law enforcement, school 
threat assessment teams should share information only with a safety nexus. Creating 
information-sharing practices that are too broad will likely squander relationships of trust 
with parents and the community that are necessary components for holistic threat 
assessment practices. Florida’s large school safety database, as described in Chapter IV, 
exemplifies concerns and public outcries that can be expected from sweeping policies.259 
 
258 Stephen Sawchuk, “What Schools Need to Know about Threat Assessment Techniques,” 
Education Week, September 4, 2019, https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/09/04/what-schools-need-
to-know-about-threat.html. 
259 Ora Tanner, “Parents and Students Deserve Answers on the State’s Massive ‘Safety Portal’ 
Database,” Tampa Bay Times, August 15, 2019, https://www.tampabay.com/opinion/2019/08/15/parents-
and-students-deserve-answers-on-the-states-massive-safety-portal-data-base-column/. 
73 
Instead of enacting broad measures, this thesis recommends narrower policies that keep 
data within schools. Effective behavioral threat assessment information sharing measures 
can be achieved through the following processes. 
a. Fusion Centers, Law Enforcement, and Threat Assessment Teams 
As previously outlined in this thesis, the Texas school safety plan recommends the 
use of fusion centers to promote school safety.260 Rather than having information flow 
from schools to fusion centers, the information cycle should flow from fusion centers to 
schools unless a safety exception, as outlined per FERPA and HIPPA, arises. This 
recommendation is appropriate because fusion centers have the ability to monitor social 
media information and online forums, and they receive reports of concerning behaviors 
from various sources. Law enforcement officials should provide support to threat 
assessment teams, and the level of collaboration can be specified by threat assessment 
mutual agreements or memorandum of understanding documents that describe law 
enforcement’s role and scope with school districts. Partnerships with law enforcement can 
be beneficial in assisting school threat assessment teams with additional information about 
a potential threat and in evaluating what constitutes criminal acts and public safety risks. 
The same governing mutual agreement can be used by law enforcement to govern and 
define the scope of information sharing between law enforcement and the school district to 
promote mutual assurances of expectations as they relate to records, privacy, and 
information sharing. 
b. School-to-School Information Sharing 
The legislative recommendation for this section highlights the need to develop 
information sharing between threat assessment teams and external districts in hopes of 
preventing concerning behaviors from escalating to violence and criminal behavior. The 
educational sector already contains notification mechanisms for criminal violations and 
certain conduct that amounts to expulsion or alternative campus placement. With threat 
assessment being a new process in the Texas education system, it is essential to develop 
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policies and laws that govern the sharing of threat assessment data—particularly as it 
relates to intervention plans so that other schools and districts can be made aware of what 
has been effective and what has not been effective in managing concerning behaviors. 
Based on the existential need to promote safety through the identification of concerning 
behaviors and by developing mitigating strategies, threat assessment requires the open flow 
of communication between all stakeholders. Connecting the dots is important in threat 
assessment, and the hope is to develop mitigating strategies that are unique to individual 
needs instead of hoping that consequential policies will fix all problems. This operational 
need validates the mandate for information sharing. The same classroom safety 
justification for making appropriate staff aware of arrests and certain expulsions can be 
applied to sharing threat assessment data. The Texas Education Agency should consider an 
active role in promoting school to school information sharing practices. Outlined below is 
a process recommendation governing thereat assessment information sharing practices. 
Threat assessment data should be shared from school to school and from district to 
district under the following framework: 
• In deferment cases, the school threat assessment team has concluded that 
the subject of the threat assessment does not pose a threat. This 
information will not be shared from school to school (same district) nor 
from district to district. 
• If a school threat assessment team concludes that the subject of the threat 
assessment poses a threat, this information will be shared from school to 
school (same district) and from district to district.  
• The state will abide by confidentiality requirements and policies that keep 
students who have been the subject of a threat assessment from being 
discriminated against or labeled. 
The notification component is not intended to label or stigmatize a child but rather to 
provide other school districts with valuable information about management strategies, 
triggers, and stabilizing factors. By having this type of information, the learning curve is 
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reduced, and other schools can avoid known pitfalls by leveraging proven strategies to 
promote safety while providing the student with practical coping skills.  
C. FEDERAL LEGISLATION: THE TAPS ACT 
The TAPS Act standardizes behavioral threat assessment and management 
processes across federal and local governments. It provides training, resources, and support 
needed to create community-based, multidisciplinary behavioral threat assessment 
processes, and management teams to recognize and manage threats before a tragedy. The 
act frames a whole-of-government approach, which could assist in disrupting operational 
silos among government agencies by promoting standardized processes and information 
sharing, as well as developing relationships of trust between the mental health community, 
law enforcement, and the local population. Because the gun debate leads to inaction and 
inaction facilitates violence, this thesis recommends the adoption of this comprehensive 
legislation as a national strategy to prevent acts of targeted violence. 
D. CONCLUSION 
School violence is a widespread, complex problem that affects our entire nation. In 
addition to generating domestic fears, the highly publicized nature of school shootings 
broadcasts our nation’s school safety vulnerabilities to a worldwide community. If children 
with little training and experience can create so much publicity and mayhem, it would not 
be too challenging for a group of trained adversaries of the United States to exploit existing 
gaps in school safety and security by launching simplistic but far-reaching acts of violence 
against U.S. schools. The amount of pain, the sense of insecurity and vulnerability, and the 
economic ramifications would be extremely detrimental to the American way of life. 
Emma Bradford and Margaret Wilson highlight such a concern with soft targets when they 
compare the challenges of securing schools to more hardened locations such as “airports, 
military installations, and government embassies.”261 
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This thesis, with its limited scope, highlights the importance of behavioral threat 
assessment and management—a proactive, data-driven, cost-effective way to prevent 
violence. Suggestions to build robust school safety and security programs have been 
provided, and legislative action at the state and national levels are recommended. This 
thesis has also identified essential components that have been overlooked, particularly as 
they relate to information sharing and case management of behavioral threat assessment 
cases—gaps that the Texas School Safety Center, the Texas Education Agency, and Texas 
Legislators should correct.  
By identifying existing opportunities, offering solutions, and recommending 
relevant legislation, this thesis helps educational institutions and homeland security 
stakeholders prioritize resources to build effective school safety and security programs. It 
may never be possible to prevent violent attacks from happening in schools entirely, but 
schools must mitigate the risk through both proactive and protective means. This research 
concludes that there is no single solution to school safety and security. The focus must be 
placed in developing a layered security protocol that leverages entire communities to make 
violence prevention an attainable goal.  
Many states are enacting laws demanding higher scrutiny in school safety and 
security initiatives. Still, few accountability mechanisms and funding resources are being 
provided to build effective programs that increase safety and security without 
compromising what should be welcoming learning environments. Determining how to 
enact and enforce such programs effectively and without sacrificing funding for competing 
priorities is an area that requires further research. 
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